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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1992), Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (1992) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992). 
II. ISSUES AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
The issues identified in Broadcast's Docketing Statement 
are repeated below. 
Issue 1. Whether the Tax Commission erred in concluding 
as a matter of law that Broadcast's customer-subscribers did not 
have "the right to possession, operation or use" of Broadcast's 
equipment, granted under a contract, which, had the Tax Commission 
ruled otherwise, would have recognized Broadcast's initial purchase 
of the same equipment from its Utah vendors a nontaxable sale for 
resale. 
Issue 2. Whether, assuming Broadcast is liable for Utah 
sales and use taxes, Broadcast is entitled to a credit against its 
Utah sales and use tax liability for those taxes Broadcast paid to 
other jurisdictions, based upon Broadcast's determination that such 
taxes should have been paid to those taxing jurisdictions in which 
the equipment is located. 
Issue 3. Whether, assuming Broadcast is not entitled to 
such a credit, the Tax Commission has imposed a double tax on 
Broadcast in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
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Issue 4. Whether the Tax Commission erred in affirming 
a 10 percent negligence penalty on the entire audit deficiency 
against Broadcast on the basis: 
(a) that Broadcast was "inattentive" to the Utah sales 
and use tax aspects of its operations in 1987, when (i) the audit 
deficiency was for the period 1987-1990 and (ii) Broadcast hired a 
tax firm in 1990 to help it structure its affairs so as to be 
lawful in all jurisdictions in which it operated; 
(b) that Broadcast had taken "inconsistent" positions as 
to in-state and out-of-state transactions, notwithstanding the 
Administrative Law Judge's ruling at the formal hearing that the 
Tax Commission had no jurisdiction and was not competent to rule 
upon the merits of Broadcast's tax filings in other states; and 
(c) that Broadcast had neglected its sales and use tax 
liability relating to the Osmond transaction, even though Broadcast 
in good faith believed that the transaction was not subject to 
sales and use taxation. 
Standard of Review. The first four issues of law arise 
from uncontroverted facts. The proper standard of appellate review 
for such issues is the "correction of error" standard, by which the 
Tax Commission decision will be upheld only if not erroneous. 
Savage Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1991) . See also Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (b) (1993). 
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Issue 5. Whether the Tax Commission erred in finding 
that Broadcast sold tangible personal property to Osmond rather 
than a nontaxable service. 
Standard of Review. This is an issue of fact, which 
should be renewed based upon the whole record to determine whether 
the Tax Commission's ruling is supported by substantial evidence. 
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(1993) . 
Issue 6. Whether, assuming that Broadcast sold tangible 
personal property to Osmond, the Tax Commission erred in failing to 
honor its long-standing exemption from sales taxes for the sale of 
"custom" as distinguished from "canned" software, or the exemption 
as a "sale for resale." 
Standard of Review. This is an issue of law arising from 
uncontroverted facts, assuming Issue No. 5 is resolved against 
Broadcast. The Tax Commission's conclusion of law should be 
reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. Savage 
Industries, supra: Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1) (b) (1993). 
III. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 - (Commerce Clause). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1) (a) - (Impose tax). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1) (1) - (Impose tax). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8)(a) - (Definition of 
"retail sale"). 
75271 3 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) - (Definition of 
"sale"). 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(12) - (Definition of 
"storage") . 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) (a) - (Definition of 
"use"). 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) - (Credit for tax 
paid). 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 Article V - (Multistate 
Tax Compact). 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) (1993) - (Standard 
of Review of Appellate Court). 
11. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1) - (Judicial Review -
Formal Adjudicative Proceedings). 
12. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) - (Supreme Court 
Jurisdiction). 
13. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(a) - (Court of Appeals 
Jurisdiction). 
14. Rule R865-19-23S - (Exemption Certificates). 
15. Rule R865-19-92S - (Computer Software and Other 
Related Transactions). 
The full text of each statutory provision is reproduced in 
Appendix C. 
IV. NATURE OF CASE 
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On August 1, 1991, the Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission issued a Statutory Notice against Broadcast in 
the total amount of $313,446.05, including $241,809.04 in 
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additional sales and use taxes, $24,180.92 as a negligence penalty 
and $47,456.09 in interest through August 31, 1991. 
Broadcast timely filed a Petition for Redetermination 
with the Utah State Tax Commission. Following a formal hearing, 
the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Decision dated June 10, 1993 (the "Final Decision"), 
sustaining the Statutory Notice as to tax, penalty and interest. 
On July 8, 1993, Broadcast petitioned for review of the 
Tax Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Decision through a Writ of Review to the Utah Supreme Court. By 
Order of the Supreme Court dated August 18, 1993, the case was 
transferred to this Court for disposition. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except for the additions listed below, Broadcast accepts 
the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact as stated in its Final 
Decision dated June 10, 1993, (R. 30), a copy of which is attached 
as Appendix A for convenience. The suggested additions are to 
Findings of Fact 6 and 15. Each finding needs a sentence added to 
acknowledge that certain satellite network uses (i.e. electronic 
mail, check verification and debit and credit card services) may be 
initiated, operated and completed by a subscriber without 
instructions to or involvement from Broadcast. Hearing Transcript 
at 44-46; 103-105. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. ISSUE 1, 
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED 
IN CONCLUDING THAT BROADCAST DID NOT GRANT A RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION, OPERATION OR USE IN ITS EQUIPMENT TO ITS 
SUBSCRIBERS. 
The Sales and Use Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101 et 
seq.. imposes tax on "retail sales of tangible personal property 
within the state" and on the "storage, use or consumption of 
tangible personal property within the state." The statute, 
however, excludes or exempts from the imposition of such taxes 
tangible personal property purchased for "resale." A "resale" is 
defined as a "subsequent or second sale." The term "sale" is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) to include the grant of 
a right to "possession, operation or use" of tangible personal 
property under circumstances which would be taxable if an outright 
sale were made pursuant to contract for consideration. 
Accordingly, if Broadcast, pursuant to contract and for 
consideration, granted its subscribers the "possession, operation 
or use" of its equipment, a "sale" would have occurred for purposes 
of the Sales and Use Tax Act, and Broadcast's initial purchases of 
the equipment would be nontaxable sales for resale. 
Much of the testimony at the hearing dealt with the 
"possession, operation or use" of the equipment by Broadcast's 
subscribers. The uncontroverted testimony was that Broadcast's 
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subscribers use the installed equipment to further their business 
operations and activities through in-store music and advertising, 
electronic mail transmissions, video teleconferencing, two-way bank 
debit and credit transfers and other applications. The auditors 
admitted that Broadcast's subscribers possessed the equipment. 
Notwithstanding, the Tax Commission's Final Decision held as a 
matter of law that Broadcast did not "grant" possession, operation 
or use of the equipment to its subscribers, and therefore did not 
purchase the equipment "for resale." This conclusion disregards 
all evidence presented below and is not a proper construction of 
the relevant statute. Accordingly, the Tax Commission's holding 
should be reversed. 
B. ISSUE 2. 
BROADCAST IS ENTITLED TO A CREDIT AGAINST ITS UTAH SALES 
AND USE TAX LIABILITY FOR THOSE TAXES BROADCAST PAID TO 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-801 and 59-12-104(28) provide for 
a credit to taxpayers for sales or use taxes paid to another state 
or jurisdiction on the same property or transaction. 
Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous language in these 
sections, the Tax Commission interprets them as containing 
"implied" conditions, to-wit (1) taxes paid to another state only 
apply if "properly" paid as determined by the Tax Commission; and 
(2) the state that can make the first conceivable claim of taxation 
has precedence in payment over any other jurisdiction. 
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Relying on these unstated requirements in the statute, 
the Tax Commission concluded that Broadcast may not claim a credit 
against its Utah tax liability for taxes paid to other 
jurisdictions. Such a conclusion is a gross distortion of the 
statutory language and must be reversed. 
C. ISSUE 3, 
IP BROADCAST IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CREDIT, THE TAX 
COMMISSION HAS IMPOSED A DOUBLE TAX ON BROADCAST IN 
VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
Under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, a state may not impose a tax upon property in 
interstate commerce which would unduly burden that commerce. In 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), the 
United States Supreme Court formulated a four-prong test to 
determine whether a state tax can withstand scrutiny under the 
Commerce Clause. To meet the second prong of the Complete Auto 
Transit test, a tax must be fairly apportioned. Fair 
apportionment, in turn, relies on an "internal" and "external 
consistency" test. The "external consistency" test asks whether 
the state has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the 
interstate activity which reasonably reflects the interstate 
component of the activity being taxed. This is similar to the 
third prong of the Complete Auto Transit test - - the tax may not 
discriminate against interstate commerce. 
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Under the facts of the present case, if the Utah tax is 
upheld and credit relief is denied, the equipment installed at 
subscriber locations in Utah will be subjected to only one sales 
use tax, while the equipment installed in out-of-state locations 
will be subjected to two sales/use taxes -- once in Utah and once 
in the out-of-state jurisdiction. Such a scheme clearly burdens 
interstate transactions as juxtaposed to similar intrastate 
transactions, and is, thus, unconstitutional. 
D. ISSUE 4. 
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN AFFIRMING A TEN PERCENT 
NEGLIGENCE PENALTY ON THE ENTIRE AUDIT DEFICIENCY. 
The Tax Commission imposed a penalty on the grounds that 
Broadcast was inattentive to its responsibilities for the 
collection and payment of sales/use taxes. However, the testimony 
at the hearing was that in 1988 Broadcast instituted a sales/use 
tax policy and thereafter utilized that policy in paying its tax 
liabilities. The penalty therefore, seems to be justified on the 
lack of a sales tax policy in 1985 and 1986, years outside of the 
audit period. 
Further, the penalty does not consider recognized case 
law establishing "negligence" in the tax context. The case law is 
to the effect that a taxpayer is not negligent if it had a 
reasonable or "good faith" basis for its position. Under the 
facts, the statutory definition of the term "sale" certainly 
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supports Broadcast's claim that it purchased equipment in Utah with 
a "resale" intent. It would be unfair to characterize the 
disagreement between the Tax Commission and over the intent and 
breadth of technical statutory terms as being without merit or 
taken in "bad faith." The imposition of a negligence penalty is in 
error as a matter of law. 
E. ISSUE 5, 
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROADCAST SOLD 
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TO OSMOND RATHER THAN A 
NONTAXABLE SERVICE. 
At the formal hearing, Broadcast's General Counsel 
testified that the alleged "sale" from Broadcast to Osmond actually 
related to Osmond's use of Broadcast's studio to develop a "master 
tape" which Osmond then duplicated at non-Broadcast facilities and 
resold to its customers. No other testimony about the transaction 
was presented. In direct contravention of this testimony, the Tax 
Commission ruled that Broadcast sold "master recording tapes" to 
Osmond. This ruling is not supported by the evidence and must be 
reversed. 
P. ISSUE 6. 
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO HONOR ITS LONG-
STANDING EXEMPTION FROM SALES TAXES FOR THE SALE OF 
"CUSTOM" AS DISTINGUISHED FROM "CANNED" SOFTWARE. 
If the Tax Commission's finding that tangible personal 
property was sold by Broadcast to Osmond, notwithstanding the 
direct testimony to the contrary, then the taxation of such a sale 
violates a long-standing Tax Commission policy. The audit years in 
question are 1977 through 1990. During such years, there was no 
statute or rule which allowed the taxation of software. Rule R865-
19-92S, allowing "software taxation" was promulgated in 1991. The 
policy prior to that time was not to tax "custom" software. Any 
tape created by Osmond at Broadcast's studios was unique to Osmond. 
Further, the sale was a "sale for resale" inasmuch as Osmond would 
take the tape and have it duplicated for subsequent sale to 
Osmond's customers. An exemption certificate was provided to the 
Tax Commission demonstrating the "sale for resale" claim. Any 
taxation of the Osmond transaction is improper and must be 
reversed. 
VI. ARGUMENTS AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES 
A. ISSUE 1. 
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED PACTS, THE TAX COMMISSION 
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT BROADCAST DID NOT GRANT A 
RIGHT OF POSSESSION, OPERATION OR USE IN ITS 
EQUIPMENT TO ITS SUBSCRIBERS. 
During the audit years in question, Broadcast purchased 
satellite communications equipment, primarily receivers, from 
selected Utah vendors, held the equipment for a short time 
(typically no more than 24 hours) in Utah and then shipped the 
equipment to out-of-state installation sites for use. On audit, 
the Tax Commission assessed tax against Broadcast for these 
purchases under two independent theories. The first theory invoked 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) (a) which taxes every "retail sale of 
tangible personal property within the state." The second theory 
relies on Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1) (1) relating to "tangible 
personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state." 
While Broadcast concedes it purchased equipment from Utah 
vendors, it argued that such purchases were not "retail sales" for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-301(1) (a) , and were not "stored" 
in Utah as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1) (1) . The 
definitions of "retail sale"1 and "storage,"2 contained in the 
Sales and Use Act, both contain exclusions for property held for 
resale. Consequently, under either theory advanced, if the 
satellite communications equipment which Broadcast purchased was 
"held for resale" and actually "sold" to its subscribers, Broadcast 
would not be liable to Utah for either a sales tax or a use tax. 
The Tax Commission's decision defined "resale" to include 
a "subsequent sale" as defined under the Sales and Use Tax Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10), in pertinent part, defines "sale": 
"Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange 
or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any 
manner, of tangible, personal property or any 
1
 The term "retail sale" is defined in Section 59-12-102(8) (a) to mean 
"any sale within the state of tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), other than resale of such 
property, item, or service by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer." 
(Emphasis added.) 
2
 The term "storage" is defined in Section 59-12-102(12) to mean "any 
keeping or retention of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or 
service under Section 59-12-103(1) , in this state for any purpose except sale in 
the regular course of business." (Emphasis added.) 
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other taxable item or service under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consideration. 
It includes: 
(e) any transaction under which right to 
possession, operation or use of any article of 
tangible personal property is granted under a 
lease or contract and the transfer of 
possession would be taxable if an outright 
sale were made. (Emphasis added.) 
Broadcast issued exemption certificates to its vendors 
claiming that the equipment purchased was a nontaxable "sale for 
resale." Broadcast intended that the "right to possess, operate or 
use" that equipment be, and in fact, was transferred to Broadcast's 
subscribers, pursuant to contract; and that such a transfer of 
possession would have been a taxable sale had title passed. 
Agreeing with Broadcast's view of the statutory scheme 
and framing of the legal issues, the Tax Commission nonetheless 
ruled in favor of taxation by concluding that: 
With respect to the right of possession, 
Broadcast grants no such right to its 
subscribers. . . . 
Under such circumstances [relating to 
operation], the subscriber's ability to turn 
the receiver on or off, push a button to 
obtain a status report or increase the volume 
does not constitute the "right to operate" the 
equipment. . . . 
Once again, based upon Broadcast's service 
agreements with its subscribers as well as 
Broadcast's actual practice, the subscriber 
only has the "right" to receive services from 
Broadcast, but no right or power over the 
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tangible property which delivers the services. 
Final Decision R. 41-42. 
The Tax Commission's Decision is manifestly wrong. For 
the reasons specified sequentially below, a fair and reasonable 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (e) inescapably leads 
to the conclusion that a "sale" (as defined in the Sales and Use 
Tax Act) occurred between Broadcast and its out-of-state 
subscribers. Any sales tax or use tax on such transactions would 
thus be due from the subscribers to the taxing jurisdiction in 
which the "sale" occurred, according to its law, and not to Utah. 
1. The Literal Statutory Language of Section 59-12-
102(10) (e) Supports Broadcast's Interpretation and 
Flatly Contradicts That of the Tax Commission. 
Based upon the literal words of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102(10) (e), and the commonly accepted definition of those words, 
Broadcast "sold" satellite communications equipment to its 
subscribers. In reaching that conclusion, Broadcast addresses 
three aspects of the statutory language the Tax Commission's 
analysis ignores. One, the statute specifically does not make 
transfer of title a prerequisite to a "sale." Instead, the test is 
whether the transaction "would be taxable i£ an outright sale were 
made," not the passage of title. (Emphasis added.) Two, the 
statute does not require the "seller to lease tangible personal 
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property to the purchaser ." The s t a t u t e says "lease or cont rac t . " 3 
The reasonable inference of the s t a tu to ry language i s tha t the Utah 
Legis la ture intended a l l contracts or agreements, whereby r igh t s to 
tangible personal property were granted from a " se l l e r " to a 
"purchaser" to be included as taxable t r ansac t ions , including 
service agreements. Three, the s t a t u t e does not require tha t the 
"purchaser" possess , operate and use the property t ransfer red to 
i t . Instead, the s t a t u t e says tha t the " se l l e r " must grant the 
"r ight" to "possession, operation or use , " thereby making the 
s t a tu to ry coverage considerably broader ( i . e . i t a t taches to a 
"r ight" whether exercised or not) and d is junc t ive ( i . e . i t a t taches 
where the s e l l e r t r ans fe r s the r igh t of possession or operation or 
use) . Any one of the three conditions would s a t i s fy the s t a tu to ry 
language. 
Other provisions of the Sales and Use Tax Act support 
these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and conclusions. For ins tance, the "storage" 
of tangible personal property, which i s taxable under Section 59-
12-103(1)(1), i s defined in Section 59-12-102(12) to mean "keeping 
3
 Throughout the proceedings, the Tax Commission has assumed, argued 
and interpreted Sect ion 59-12-102(10) (e) as applicable only to written l e a s e s . 
This i s manifest error. The express language of t h i s s ec t ion includes a l l 
contracts , whether ora l , wri t ten, l eases or some other grant of possess ion . In 
Tasters Ltd. , Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, No. 920659-CA, s l i p op. 
(Ut. App. Sept. 24, 1993) t h i s Court reversed the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission, in part , because i t had indulged in the same kind of 
overreaching as does the Tax Commission here. Said the Court, " I n i t i a l l y , the 
Board appears to interpret "pursuant to contract" to require a written contract 
. . . M a k i n g t h i s kind of extra l e g i s l a t i v e embellishment to the s ta tute i s 
inappropriate." Id. at 10 (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . 
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or retention of tangible personal property . . . , in this state 
for any purpose except sales in the regular course of business." 
(Emphasis added). Likewise, Section 59-12-104(28) provides an 
exemption for "property purchased for resale in this state, in the 
regular course of business, either in its original form or as an 
ingredient or component part of a manufactured or compounded 
product." Viewed as a comprehensive whole, these provisions are 
intended to tax the sale or use of tangible personal property only 
once. Consequently, wholesale purchases by lessors and sellers who 
transfer the right to possess, operate or use equipment whether or 
not coupled with any service they may sell, are not liable for the 
sales or use tax. 
2. Based Upon the Undisputed Facts of This Case, 
Broadcast's Subscribers Had the Right of Possession 
or Operation or Use of Broadcast's Equipment 
Pursuant to Contract. 
Any honest application of the law to the undisputed facts 
of this case leads to the conclusion that a "sale" within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (e) between Broadcast and 
its subscriber occurred. Each of the service agreements between 
Broadcast and its subscribers is, obviously and undisputedly, a 
contract. The Tax Commission also recognizes that the "course of 
conduct" between the parties can be a part of such agreements. 
Final Decision R. 41. Each agreement is for consideration and 
binds the parties by extending certain benefits and imposing 
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certain burdens. Again, the Tax Commission does not conclude 
otherwise. 
However, the Tax Commission concludes that "Broadcast 
grants no right [of possession, operation, or use] to its 
subscribers." Id. This conclusion is irreconcilably at odds with 
the testimony given at the hearing. 
Language from a contract selected at random (R. Contracts 
Folders-No. 7 at 2) provides: 
3. Transmission Responsibility. To enable 
Subscriber to receive Company's service, 
Company shall furnish, install and keep in 
good operating condition all equipment 
necessary to receive audio transmissions via 
satellite during the term of this Agreement. 
It shall be the Participating Retail Store's 
responsibility to keep the equipment in an 
operational mode, i.e.. tuned to the proper 
frequency and to perform other on site 
ministerial tasks. (Emphasis added.) 
Broadcast's obligation to "furnish and install" equipment 
at each subscriber location is, by any reasonable interpretation of 
the language, a "grant" to the subscriber of legal rights to have 
(possess) and use the equipment. Moreover, under the parties' 
course of conduct throughout the years, the subscribers clearly 
"possess, use and operate" the equipment for the enhancement of 
their business activities and operations. 
The Tax Commission's dogged refusal to read the contract 
reasonably and within the context intended by the parties lead 
75271 17 
Broadcast to introduce substantial testimony at the hearing as to 
the parties' intentions and their course of conduct over the years. 
Testimony was given by Broadcast officers and also a subscriber. 
All the witnesses unequivocally testified that Broadcast intended 
to and did grant "possession, use and operation" of the equipment 
to the subscribers.4 See Appendix B for numerous excerpts of the 
hearing testimony. Even the Tax Commission auditors admitted that 
the subscribers had possession of the equipment. Hearing 
Transcript at 371-372. See also Deposition of Rick Mitchell at 12-
13. 
The Tax Commission recognized in i t s Findings of Fact: 
Broadcast ' s employees or cont rac tors i n s t a l l 
the necessary equipment a t each subsc r ibe r ' s 
l oca t ion . S a t e l l i t e dishes are t y p i c a l l y 
mounted on the bu i l d ing ' s roof and at tached to 
the b u i l d i n g ' s framework. Cables connect the 
externa l equipment to the other components, 
which are usual ly located in a secure o f f i ce . 
4
 For example, Dwight Egan, the President of Broadcast, in response to 
a question regarding how the subscribers were granted the r ight to possess the 
equipment i n s t a l l e d at each loca t ion t e s t i f i e d : "Thev have a grant of r ight 
through t h i s contract [service agreement] . . . . If our contract sa id we are 
going to grant you possess ion , operation and use, I don't know that that would 
change things here." Hearing Transcript at 81-82. 
John Lasater, Manager of Store Systems for SaveMart Supermarkets, a 
subscriber, t e s t i f i e d that SaveMart had equipment i n s t a l l e d in 94 of i t s s tores 
and that i t d a i l y and hourly used the equipment to further i t s business 
operations and a c t i v i t i e s through i n - s t o r e music and advert i s ing , e l e c t r o n i c 
mail , video conferencing and a two-way bank debit and cred i t system. He further 
s ta ted that possess ion , use and control of the equipment res ided in SaveMart. 
Hearing Transcript at 89-105. 
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Broadcast usually obtains any permits 
necessary for the installation of its 
equipment at the subscriber's location. 
Final Decision R. 33. 
From the overwhelming evidence presented at the hearing 
(and there was not a whisper of testimony or evidence to the 
contrary), it would be disingenuous (if not dishonest) to conclude 
that the subscribers do not have a right to possess, use, or 
operate Broadcast's equipment. However, refusing to admit the sun 
"rising in the East," the Tax Commission, without discussion or 
explanation, concludes that Broadcast does not "grant" its 
subscribers the right to possession of its equipment. This 
conclusion is incredulous and patently wrong for several reasons. 
One, it is directly contrary to the uncontroverted 
testimony of all witnesses as to the "intent" of the contract 
provisions and the course of conduct between Broadcast and its 
subscribers. See Appendix B. 
Two, the service agreements state and the Tax Commission 
found that "Broadcast employees or contractors install the 
necessary equipment at each subscriber's location." Implicit 
within this finding is a recognition that, by mutual consent of the 
parties. Broadcast contractually grants possession of the equipment 
to the subscriber. That is, if the equipment is located at the 
subscriber's store as a matter of undisputed fact, the subscriber 
could only have obtained possession of the equipment either 
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lawfully or unlawfully. There was no suggestion that the 
subscribers stole, extorted, or unlawfully took possession of or 
received the equipment at their locations. The only other 
possibility, therefore, is that the subscribers have the equipment 
at their locations lawfully; that is, pursuant to an agreement with 
Broadcast. The only honest and logical conclusion from these 
undisputed facts is that Broadcast did indeed grant its subscribers 
the right to possess the satellite equipment. 
Three, the Tax Commission, in interpreting Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-102 (10) (e) relied exclusively on the definition of 
possession found in Black's Law Dictionary, rather than the statute 
itself. This, likewise is manifest error. The Tax Commission, 
quoting Black's Law Dictionary, defines possession as: 
The detention and control, or the manual or 
ideal custody, of anything which, may be the 
subject of property, for one's use and 
enjoyment, either as owner or as the 
proprietor of a qualified right in it and 
either held personally or by another who 
exercise it in one's place and name. Act or 
state of possessing, that condition of facts 
under which one can exercise his power over a 
corporeal thing at his pleasure to the 
exclusion of all others. 
Final Decision R. 37. (Emphasis added.) 
Apparently applying this definition of "possession," the 
Tax Commission concludes that "Broadcast grants no right [of 
possession] to its subscribers." Id. at 40. There is no basis or 
analysis. The Tax Commission simply claims "Broadcast grants only 
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the right to receive various services." Id. For reasons discussed 
above, such conclusion flies in the face of testimony and the Tax 
Commission's own Findings of Fact. More important to the point 
here, however, is that the Tax Commission ignores its own 
definition of possession. Broadcast's subscribers have "manual or 
ideal custody" because the equipment is physically attached on 
their property.5 Broadcast cannot have access to the equipment 
(locked in the store manager's office) without the subscriber's 
consent. To maintain, as does the Tax Commission, that such 
activities do not qualify as possession of the equipment distorts 
the very definition of the word "possession" supplied by the Tax 
Commission. 
Most important, the Tax Commission, without so much as an 
acknowledgement, ignores the definition of possession found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-102 (10) (e) which is: 
such transfer of possession would be 
taxable if an outright sale were 
made. 
5
 The subscribers, just as obviously, have a "qualified" right in the 
property because (i) the property is physically located at their store with the 
consent of Broadcast; (ii) the subscriber communicates any desired changes in 
services to Broadcast which then implements those changes; (iii) the subscribers 
operate the volume controls and "status" buttons to generate printouts for 
trouble shooting purposes (iv) the printers require paper input and adjustment 
by the subscribers; (v) the printers and other peripheral equipment require 
cartridge changes and maintenance by the subscribers; (vi) the subscribers are 
contractually bound to indemnify Broadcast for damage, destruction or loss to the 
equipment while it is at the subscriber's location; and (vii) certain subscribers 
use the equipment for applications unrelated to Broadcast services, including 
check authorization, bank debit said credit, and electronic mail. 
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Under this statutory language, the appropriate question 
the Tax Commission should have asked, but did not, is what 
possession means under Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court, in Young 
Electric Sign Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 242, 
291 P.2d 900 (1955) , construed the predecessor statute to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-102(10)(e) to answer that question.6 In Young. the 
taxpayer agreed with its customers to construct electrical signs, 
install them on the customer's premises, and maintain the signs. 
Title to the signs remained with Young. The customer had the right 
to advertise on Young's sign. Young argued that its "sales and 
repair and maintenance" were not taxable since it had a "service 
agreement" with the customer. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed. Citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-2 (g) (1953) (the predecessor to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102(10)(e) (1990)), the Court held the transaction was a taxable 
"sale": 
This statute is not ambiguous. It is not 
controverted that the transfer of possession 
of the signs under the rental contracts herein 
involved are such that if outright sales were 
made they would be taxable under this section. 
In such event, the plain wording of the 
statute requires the taxes to be computed upon 
the rentals paid. What elements enter into 
the charges for these rentals can be of no 
materiality. 
Id. at 902 (emphasis added). 
6
 The Tax Commission's decision does not even mention Young although 
the case was extensively briefed and argued at the formal hearing. 
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The Court continued to explain: 
The material fact is that there is transfer of 
the right to continuous possession of personal 
property, the possession of which under a 
contract or lease would be taxable if an 
outright sale were made, and as we pointed out 
in the case of the original rental agreement, 
it is the charges for these agreements which 
are taxable and not the various elements which 
enter into the determination of these charges. 
Id. at 903 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Broadcast grants by contract possession and 
use and operation of the satellite equipment to the subscriber, 
which would be, absolutely indisputably, a taxable sale had title 
transferred to the subscriber. Hence, the transaction between 
Broadcast and the subscriber is a "sale" within the express 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 (10) (e) . The only 
significant distinction between Young and this case is that 
Broadcast transferred possession of tangible personal property to 
its subscribers outside of Utah which means that those sales are 
not taxable by Utah. 
This conclusion is further supported by the legislative 
history of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (e) . The Utah Legislature 
intended that this statute be broadly based so as to capture any 
kind of transaction where a taxpayer sought to avoid taxation on a 
transfer of possession simply by claiming that legal title or 
ownership did not pass from one party to the other. Since Young. 
the Utah Legislature has broadened the statute to make its "catch 
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all" base even clearer. The statute at issue in Young required 
"continuous possession or use" for a sale to have occurred, 
whereas, in this case, a sale covers "any transaction under which 
right to possession, operation, or use" is granted. At the time of 
audit, possession was no longer modified by the word "continuous." 
Moreover, the word "operation" has been added to possession or use. 
The effect of these word changes is to broaden the statutory 
definition of "sale". Likewise, the addition of "any transaction" 
suggests a legislative intent to expand the taxation net without 
limitation and in its broadest sense. 
In Young, the Tax Commission interpreted the predecessor 
to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 (10) (e) broadly to preclude the 
taxpayer from avoiding taxation. In this case, the Tax Commission 
has flip-flopped to read the same statute narrowly so that under 
these circumstances, the taxpayer is likewise ensnared in Utah's 
taxation web. By reversing its prior interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (e) (from a liberal to a narrow construction) 
the Tax Commission has made Broadcast's initial purchases from its 
vendor taxable in Utah. Such Machiavellian interpretations of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-102 (10) (e) are unfair, erroneous and must be 
reversed. 
75271 24 
3. The Taxable Transaction in This Case Should be the 
Consumer-Subscriber7 s Use of the Equipment in Their 
Respective States, and According to Their Law. 
Utah case law supports Broadcast's claim that the 
subscriber, not Broadcast, should pay sales or use taxes on the 
equipment the subscriber possesses. In BJ-Titan Services v. State 
Tax Commission. 842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
advanced two modes of analysis in determining whether the tangible 
personal property used in rendering the service is taxable. The 
first is called "an essence of the transaction" test. If the 
transaction is an "inseparable combination of tangible personal 
property and services," the issue to decide is whether the "essence 
of the transaction" is either the sale of tangible personal 
property (in which case the sale is taxable) or the sale of service 
(in which case the sale is not taxable). Id. at 825.7 If on the 
other hand, tangible personal property is used "in the process of 
. . . rendering services," the issue is "who is the ultimate user 
or consumer of the tangible personal property" and who, as the 
ultimate consumer, should pay the sales or use tax. Id. This is 
the ultimate consumer test. 
In this case, the second mode of analysis is appropriate 
because identifiable, separable, tangible personal property, i.e., 
(the satellite receiving equipment) is used in rendering a service 
7
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1) (b) (1993) this would no 
longer be an issue committed to agency discretion. 
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(i.e., the transmission of electronic signals). Who then is the 
ultimate consumer? Who should pay the use tax -- Broadcast or the 
subscriber? 
In deciding such issues, the BJ-Titan Court explained 
that the professional services category falls along a spectrum of 
cases where some purchases are taxable and some are not. On the 
one extreme of the spectrum are manufacturers whose purchases are 
not taxable because the ultimate consumer is the purchaser of the 
manufactured product. The consumer and not the manufacturer pays 
the sales tax. On the other extreme are contractors who pay a 
sales tax on all their purchases because they are the ultimate 
consumers of tangible personal property inasmuch as they transform 
the identity of tangible personal property into real property. 
Near the manufacturing end of the spectrum is the 
automobile repair category, where purchases by mechanics are not 
taxable. As the Court explained, "here, the customer, not the 
repairer, is the ultimate consumer of auto parts because the parts 
are installed without alteration and can be easily separated from 
the labor performed in installing them." Id. at 827 (emphasis 
added.) 
Broadcast, in that sense, is indistinguishable from an 
automobile mechanic. Broadcast provides its communication network 
services to its subscribers. Necessarily connected with the 
subscriber's receipt of those services is the subscriber's 
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possession, use or operation of certain tangible personal property. 
As with the automobile mechanic, the ultimate consumer of the 
satellite equipment in this case is the subscriber because the 
equipment is installed without alteration and can be easily 
separated from the installation labor and the network services. 
Before and after installation, the equipment's identity remains 
unchanged. Just as the current owner "uses" the equipment supplied 
by the mechanic, the subscriber "uses" the equipment supplied by 
Broadcast. Consequently, the subscriber should pay whatever use 
tax may be imposed upon the equipment's use according to the law of 
the subscriber's jurisdiction.8 
In summary, as the Tax Commission stated in its Decision, 
the issue is whether Broadcast purchased satellite receiving 
equipment from Utah vendors, and "resold" that equipment to its 
subscribers. If so, the initial purchase was a nontaxable "sale 
for resale." In deciding whether Broadcast "resold" its equipment 
to its subscribers, the Tax Commission concluded that Broadcast did 
not "grant possession, use or operation" of the equipment to its 
subscribers. This conclusion of law is disingenuous and manifestly 
without merit. It flies in the face of the undisputed facts and 
the statutory definition of the term "sale." 
8
 The Tax Commission's reliance on Nucor Steel v. State Tax Commission, 
832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992) in its Response to Docketing Statement is frivolous. 
In Nucor the taxpayer consumed, and changed the identity of the materials at 
issue. Here the equipment is not taken out of the boxes in which they are sold 
to Broadcast. 
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B. ISSUE 2. 
BROADCAST IS ENTITLED TO A CREDIT AGAINST ITS 
UTAH SALES AND USE TAX LIABILITY FOR THOSE 
TAXES BROADCAST PAID TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
If, notwithstanding the arguments made under Issue 1, 
this Court sustains the Tax Commission's decision, then Broadcast 
is entitled, as a matter of law, to receive a credit for the taxes 
paid to the other states. 
The Multistate Tax Compact as adopted and codified at 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987) provides: 
Article V - Elements of Sales and Use Tax Laws 
Tax Credit. 
1. Each purchaser liable for a use tax 
on tangible personal property shall be enti-
tled to full credit for the combined amount or 
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes 
paid by him with respect to the same property 
to another state or any subdivision thereof. 
In addition to the language of the Multistate Tax 
Compact, the Utah Legislature has enacted Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(2 8) which provides: 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
(28) Property upon which a sales or use 
tax was paid to some other state, or one of 
its subdivisions, except that the state shall 
be paid any difference between the tax paid 
and the tax imposed by this part and part 2, 
and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid 
was greater than the tax imposed by this part 
and Part 2; (emphasis added.) 
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The express intent of both statutes is to provide a 
credit for taxes paid to another jurisdiction. The Tax Commission, 
however, argues that Broadcast misinterprets the "intent" of the 
statutes, and that there are unstated conditions in the statutes, 
to-wit: (i) any tax paid to another jurisdiction only applies if 
it was "properly" paid; and (ii) the state that can make the first 
conceivable claim for taxation has precedence in payment over any 
other jurisdiction. These conditions imply that someone, 
presumably the Tax Commission, is entitled to make a determination 
of when the other state's taxes are "properly" due and payable, and 
if even "properly" payable, the credits can be ignored if Utah can 
claim the first incidence of taxation. 
Such "implied conditions" in the statute are fallacious 
for a number of reasons. One, the Utah State Tax Commission is not 
competent nor empowered to rule on or interpret another state's tax 
laws. Two, the Utah State Tax Commission is not entitled to 
rewrite or amend Utah's existing statutes. The statutes on their 
face are unambiguous and need not resort to rules of construction 
to ascertain their plain meaning. The best evidence of the 
legislature's intent is the precise language of the statute. See 
Chris & Dicks Lumber v. Tax Commission. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). 
The Tax Commissions's attempt to interpret and write conditions 
into the statute is an usurpation of the legislative power and is 
void ab initio. 
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Broadcast's research reveals only two court cases which 
judicially interpret Article V of the Multistate Tax Compact and 
the applicability of the credit. The cases are Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) and 
Wyoming v. Sinclair Pipeline Co., 605 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1980). 
The rationale of these cases are in some respects 
opposite, even though both cases uphold the imposition of 
additional tax burdens on the taxpayer. In Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. . the Utah Supreme Court sustained a sales tax on the taxpayer's 
purchase of steel materials and other products used in the 
fabrication of large steel tanks in Utah, where following 
fabrication, the tanks were transported to the State of California 
and installed on cement foundations. The taxpayer had paid a use 
tax to California pursuant to its law. In upholding the imposition 
of the sales tax, the Utah Supreme Court accepted the findings of 
the Tax Commission that Chicago Bridge & Iron Company was a real 
property contractor, rather than a manufacturer, and thus the 
consumer or end user of the fabrication materials. 
In response to the taxpayer's assertion that Utah's tax 
was an unconstitutional "double tax" of the same transaction, the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled no double taxation would occur based upon 
language of Article V of the Multistate Tax Compact. The Court 
said: 
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Under this article [Article V of the 
Multistate Compact], California, in imposing a 
use tax, must give credit against that tax for 
any Utah sales tax levied, since "precedents 
in liability shall prevail over precedents in 
payment". Resolution of Multistate Tax 
Commission (1980). Accordingly, the 
imposition of the Utah sales tax in this case 
should not result in double taxation. If it 
does, the remedy lies in the state that seeks 
to impose the tax having that effect. 
Id. at 309. (Emphasis added.) 
In the other case, Wyoming v. Sinclair Pipeline Co., 
supra. the taxpayer, Sinclair Pipeline Co., purchased pipe in 
Colorado which was ultimately installed in a pipeline located in 
Wyoming. The company paid a Wyoming use tax on the installation of 
the pipe. Two years thereafter the Colorado taxing authorities 
assessed a tax deficiency on the same pipe claiming that the "first 
incidence of taxation" took place in Colorado. Sinclair Pipeline 
Co. then paid the assessed Colorado sales tax and filed for a 
refund from the State of Wyoming. The Wyoming Supreme Court, also 
interpreting Article V of the Multistate Tax Compact, ruled that 
Sinclair Pipeline was not entitled to a refund. It stated: 
The statute says that a taxpayer who has 
"paid" his tax to one state will receive a 
credit upon any tax which may be due another 
state on that same property. In the instant 
matter, Sinclair had paid the Wyoming tax 
before Colorado ever assessed the taxpayer. 
If Sinclair owed the State of Colorado a tax, 
it was a sum less the amount it had paid Wyo-
ming. That is what the statute says. (Empha-
sis in original.) 
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The Court went on to say: 
Where there is plain unambiguous language used 
in a statute there is no room for construction 
and a court may not properly look for and 
impose another meaning. . . . The statute 
says nothing about the "first taxable 
incident" and while Sinclair argues that the 
statute is clear and unambiguous on its face 
and therefore we need not look further to 
ascertain its meaning, Sinclair in fact finds 
it necessary to look past the plain words of 
the statute to a rule of use tax law in order 
to reach the conclusion it urges. 
The Court pointed out that: 
. . . once Sinclair paid Wyoming the tax it 
was entitled to a deduction in that amount 
from any tax due Colorado. If Sinclair did 
not choose to assert this right and instead 
elected to pay Colorado's tax without deduct-
ing what it had previously paid Wyoming, that 
is not Wyoming's fault. 
Id. at 379. 
This Court should follow the Sinclair Pipeline rationale 
because Chicago Bridge & Iron is inapplicable to and cannot be 
squared with the facts of this case. 
One, Sinclair Pipeline is faithful to the statutory 
language. Article V of the Compact says "taxes paid," as the 
Wyoming Supreme Court recognized. The law is Article V, not 
whatever the Multistate Tax Commission (a voluntary association) 
wishes it to be. Two, since the decision in Sinclair Pipeline in 
1980, there has been ample opportunity for the Multistate Tax 
Commission to change the model language in Article V if a change 
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was warranted. No amendments or changes have been adopted. Three, 
and most importantly, the Utah State Legislature has not seen fit 
to amend the statute to include the language the Tax Commission 
argues is the proper interpretation of Article V of the Multistate 
Tax Compact. Until the statutory language is changed by the 
legislature, neither the Tax Commission nor the Courts are free to 
read additional conditions into the present clear and unambiguous 
statutory language. 
Moreover, there are many substantive differences between 
the facts in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. and the present case. 
First, in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.. raw materials such as sheet 
metal, rivets and bolts were purchased by the taxpayer and 
manufactured and fabricated into tanks and related devices in Utah. 
At least in some instances the fabricated tanks were then 
transported to and permanently attached to real property outside of 
Utah. The controversy in the case centered on whether the 
taxpayer, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., was a "manufacturer" or a 
"real property contractor." Taxation by Utah turned exclusively on 
that determination. In the present case, neither the 
"manufacturer" nor the "real property contractor" concepts have any 
applicability. 
Second, the specific holding in the Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. turns on the fact that the taxpayer purchased, manufactured and 
fabricated materials into tanks and other final products in Utah. 
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As such, those materials were "all used within the state by the 
taxpayers." Id. at 308. In the present case, Broadcast purchased 
fully completed, operational receivers from Utah vendors. The Utah 
vendors packaged the receivers. Broadcast, without so much as even 
opening the boxes, immediately shipped the equipment to its out-of-
state installation sites. Chet Paulsen's testimony in the Tax 
Commission hearing was that the receivers were generally shipped 
from Utah to the out-of-state sites within 24 hours of their 
receipt. No fabrication, modification, manufacturing or 
repackaging of any kind was done by Broadcast on the receivers. 
The equipment was not "used within the state by the taxpayer11 
(Broadcast) in any way. 
A third important distinction between Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. and the present case is that the credit which the Utah 
Supreme Court said California "must" give is unavailable to 
Broadcast in those states that are not Multistate Tax Compact 
members. The Supreme Court's holding in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
is expressly dependent on the language of the Multistate Tax 
Compact, of which Utah and California are members, to the effect 
that California "must give credit" for any tax paid to Utah. 
Sinclair Pipeline demonstrates the inherent unfairness and naivete 
of that position. But, even assuming the Utah Supreme Court is 
right, only 18 states and the District of Columbia are members of 
the Multistate Tax Compact. Testimony at the hearing indicated 
that Broadcast has subscribers in virtually all 50 states and in 
some foreign countries. Accordingly, even if the Utah Supreme 
Court's Multistate Tax Compact credit analysis is correct, it fails 
to provide any reasonable allowances in the other 32 plus 
jurisdictions wherein Broadcast does business. This problem is 
particularly exacerbated by states, such as Nevada, which do not 
provide any credit relief. Thus, the Court's analysis is shallow 
and fails to address the problems it creates in the majority of the 
states wherein the Multistate Tax Compact does not apply. 
Clearly the Tax Commission's implied conditions to the 
granting of a credit will not "avoid duplicative taxation" if the 
states can merely interpret Article V for their own selfish 
purposes as evidenced by the results of Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
and Sinclair Pipeline Co. 
C. ISSUE 3, 
IF BROADCAST IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CREDIT, THE 
TAX COMMISSION HAS IMPOSED A DOUBLE TAX ON 
BROADCAST IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE. 
Under the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution a state may not impose a tax upon property in the flow of 
interstate commerce which would unduly burden that commerce. In 
the landmark case of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 430 U.S. 
274 (1977), the United States Supreme Court enunciated an oft-used 
four-prong test to determine whether a state tax will withstand 
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scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. The four prongs of the test 
are: 
(1) Is the tax applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus to the taxing state; 
(2) Is the tax fairly apportioned; 
(3) Does the tax discriminate against 
Interstate Commerce; and 
(4) Is the tax fairly related to the services 
provided by the state. 
A focus on the second and third prongs of the Complete 
Auto Transit test is warranted under the facts of this case. As 
will be demonstrated, without allowing the credits argued under 
Issue 2 above, the Utah's imposed tax will not pass constitutional 
scrutiny. 
The second prong of the Complete Auto Transit test is 
fair apportionment. The central purpose behind the fair 
apportionment requirement is to ensure that each state taxes only 
its fair share of an interstate transaction. Goldberg v. Sweet. 
488 U.S. 252 (1989) at 260. In Goldberg the court stated that it 
determines whether a tax is fairly apportioned by examining whether 
the tax is internally and externally consistent. To be internally 
consistent, the tax must be so structured that if every state were 
to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result. Id. 
at 261. To be externally consistent, the Goldberg court stated: 
The external consistency test asks whether the 
state has taxed only that portion of the 
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revenues from the interstate activity which 
reasonably reflects the in-state component of 
the activity being taxed. [citations 
omitted.] We thus examine the in-state 
business activity which triggers the taxable 
event and the practical or economic effect of 
that tax on that interstate activity. Id. at 
262. 
This test is clearly violated under the Tax Commission's 
application of the law. As described under Issue 1, the Tax 
Commission has imposed the tax under two separate theories: 
(1) the purchase of the satellite equipment from Utah vendors; or 
(2) the storage of the purchased equipment in Utah. The 
approximately 800 different taxing jurisdictions (states, counties 
and cities) wherein the satellite equipment is installed, have 
imposed sales/use taxes premised on the installation, presence and 
use of the satellite equipment therein. No apportionment of the 
tax has occurred between Utah and the other jurisdictions. 
Under Utah's theory, if the equipment was installed 
within the state of Utah, that equipment would only be taxed once 
by Utah. But if the equipment was installed outside of Utah, that 
equipment would be subject to double taxation, once for its 
purchase/24-hour storage in Utah and once for its installation, 
presence and use outside of Utah. This is blatant burdening of 
interstate commerce. 
The Tax Commission argues that the Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Chicago Bridge & Iron allows it to tax Broadcast's 
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purchases despite the Commerce Clause. Such claims are not well 
founded. Unlike Chicago Bridge & Iron. Broadcast did not 
fabricate, manufacture or modify the equipment in Utah in any way. 
The equipment remained as originally packaged by the manufacturer. 
No value was added to the goods by Broadcast in Utah. The 
equipment merely passed through Utah on its journey to its intended 
installation site, whether in Utah or outside of Utah. 
The third prong of the Complete Auto Transit test 
prohibits the state from imposing a discriminatory tax on 
interstate commerce. This rule is a fundamental tenet of the 
Commerce Clause. As described above, the tax, as applied by the 
Tax Commission, clearly discriminates against interstate commerce. 
Equipment installations in Utah will be subjected to only one 
sales/use tax, while the installations outside of Utah will be 
subjected to two sales/use taxes--one for the equipment's 
purchase/storage in Utah and a second for its storage and use 
outside of Utah. 
A state may satisfy the second and third prong of the 
Complete Auto Transit test by providing a credit for taxes paid in 
another state. D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara. 486 U.S. 24 (1988). 
The credit provisions in Utah's statute for taxes paid to other 
states protects Utah's taxing scheme under the Complete Auto 
Transit tests. However, the Tax Commission's interpretation of 
Utah's credit provisions would destroy their very purpose. As 
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demonstrated by the Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. and Sinclair Pipeline 
Co. cases, the risk of multiple taxation is not just hypothetical, 
if the statutory credit is contingent upon whether the Tax 
Commission finds the other state's law was "properly" applied or 
that one state's taxing rights take "precedence" over the other 
state's rights. The Sales and Use Tax Act, as applied by the Tax 
Commission, will not meet the Complete Auto Transit tests. 
D. ISSUE 4. 
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN AFFIRMING A TEN 
PERCENT NEGLIGENCE PENALTY ON THE ENTIRE AUDIT 
DEFICIENCY. 
The Auditing Division assessed a 10% negligence penalty 
against Broadcast. The Auditing Division claims Broadcast was 
negligent because it "did not institute reasonable controls to 
ensure proper collection or accrual of tax," and, in addition, "did 
not properly train employees handling taxes by providing them with 
current laws and rules." Statutory Notice, R. 562. 
The Tax Commission's decision sustains the penalty on 
different grounds. It states: 
In view of Broadcasts inattention to its sales 
and use tax liability during the initial 
portion of the audit period, its adoption of 
inconsistent positions with respect to its 
Utah and out-of-state installations, and its 
neglect of the sales and use liability on the 
Osmond transaction, . . . [the penalty] is 
appropriate. 
Final Decision, R. 24. 
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The purported justifications for assessing a negligence 
penalty against Broadcast are specious. The Tax Commission's 
Finding are inconsistent with the audit report assertions. More 
importantly, they make no attempt whatever to justify the 
negligence penalty under the standard of Utah Code Ann. § 69-1-
401(3)(a). They seem motivated by vindictiveness, not by facts. 
Each of these conclusions are demonstrated below. 
First, it is obvious from a review of the audit report, 
transcript and depositions, that the justification for imposing a 
negligence penalty on Broadcast is inconsistent and unfair. The 
audit report asserts that Broadcast did not institute reasonable 
controls and policies for collection and payment of sales/use 
taxes. However, Reese Davis testified that in 1988 he developed a 
sales/use tax policy and wrote to every state and jurisdiction in 
which Broadcast did business, offering to pay whatever tax may have 
been due and requesting an abatement of penalty and interest. 
Hearing Transcript at 121-122. Mr. Davis also hired Vertex Tax 
Advisors, Inc. to complete a review of Broadcast's sales/use tax 
policy and instruct Broadcast as to what it was required to do to 
comply with the sales/use tax laws in the states in which it did 
business. Vertex's conclusion was "BI is in total compliance and 
has stood the test of any state audit that has been conducted." 
Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit P-22, p. 1. Even assuming Vertex was 
wrong, it should be obvious to any fair-minded person that from 
1988 on, Broadcast, by writing every jurisdiction and hiring tax 
consultants, made a good faith effort to comply with the sales/use 
tax laws in the jurisdictions in which it did business. The audit 
period was from January 1, 1987 through September 30, 1990. The 
audit report's accusation that Broadcast had no reasonable controls 
or training during the audit period was simply false. It had 
sales/use tax policies and controls starting in 1988. Likewise, it 
is an abuse to impose a penalty for 1988 through 1990 on the basis 
of Broadcast's lack of a sales/use tax policy and training program 
in 1985 and 1986, years outside the audit period. 
Second, it is particularly egregious for the Tax 
Commission to uphold the penalty because of Broadcast's alleged 
"inconsistent positions with respect to its Utah and out-of-state 
installations." The Tax Commission lacks jurisdiction and 
competency to interpret another state's tax laws or decide another 
state's tax liabilities. The Administrative Law Judge so ruled in 
the hearing. Hearing Transcript at 363. Yet the Tax Commission 
implicitly must have determined the basis of Broadcast's out-of-
state tax liabilities in order to conclude that Broadcast has been 
"inconsistent." Furthermore, it is not inconsistent for "Broadcast 
to consider itself to be the seller of the Utah equipment" and pay 
tax on the price of the equipment, rather than on the "entire 
amount of its service fees." As discussed under Issue 1, the 
definition of "sale" includes a "lease or contract." The Tax 
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Commission's statement would only necessarily be true under a lease 
calling for a stream of payments. It ignores the grant of rights 
under a "contract" which may not also be a lease requiring a stream 
of payments for the equipment. 
Third, as described under Issue 5, Broadcast provided its 
facilities to Osmond. There is no basis to conclude that Broadcast 
"sold" tangible personal property to Osmond. 
Fourth, the Tax Commission's zeal to tax Broadcast and 
impose a penalty runs afoul of recognized case law. Negligence is 
defined, "The omission to do something which a reasonable man, 
guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate 
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a 
reasonable and prudent man would not do." Black's Law Dictionary 
"Negligence" (1991 ed.) Picking up on this theme, state case law 
is to the effect that a taxpayer is not negligent if it had a 
reasonable or "good faith" basis for its position. Chicago Bridge 
& Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, infra. See also Phillips 
Mercantile Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dep't. 786 P.2d 
1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (maintained "a good faith doubt 
concerning the taxability of its transactions."); C & D Trailer 
Sales v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't. 604 P.2d 835, 837-838 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1979) (nonpayment results from "diligent protest . . . based 
on informed consultation and advice."); Tummuru Trades. Inc. v. 
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Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1991) (a "negligence" 
penalty lies within the sound discretion of the Tax Commission.) 
The matter at hand has been hotly contested by both 
parties. It certainly cannot be reasonably asserted that 
Broadcast's transactions with its subscribers, in light of the 
statutory language and the uncontroverted facts, is unreasonable or 
without merit. In fact, Broadcast's position has considerably more 
merit than the Tax Commission's position. Accordingly, within the 
good faith standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.. supra. the penalty is inappropriate. 
E. ISSUE 5, 
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
BROADCAST SOLD TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TO 
OSMOND RATHER THAN A NONTAXABLE SERVICE. 
The Tax Commission's ruling that Broadcast sold tangible 
personal property to Osmond underscores its blatant disregard for 
the testimony presented. At the formal hearing, Mr. Benson 
testified that the alleged "sale" from Broadcast to Osmond actually 
related to the use by Osmond of Broadcast's studio to develop a 
"master tape" which Osmond then duplicated and apparently resold to 
its customers. Mr. Benson's testimony was: 
Yes. Merrill came to us and requested that he 
be able to use our recording facility to make 
master tapes of certain recording material, 
which we agreed to let him do for a fee. He 
came and produced those, what's called a 
master tape, and then he took the master tape 
and had it duplicated some place else, I don't 
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know where, and then he. through another 
distributor, were selling master tapes of 
these recordings to convenience stores. 
With regard to the exemption certificate, we 
never got an exemption certificate because we 
were only providing recording services and a 
recording facility to Merrill, and didn't 
think we needed it. Subsequent to the audit, 
the Tax Commission took issue with that and 
said we were, in fact, selling personal 
property, which we still don't think we were 
doing. (Emphasis added) 
Hearing Transcript at 220. 
No evidence was presented at the hearing to contradict 
Mr. Benson's testimony. The nature and character of the claimed 
transaction was not otherwise explored at the hearing. 
Notwithstanding this testimony, the Tax Commission concludes: "The 
subsequent sale of the master tape to Osmond was, therefore, a sale 
of tangible personal property subject to a sales and use tax under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)." Final Decision, R.22. This 
statement is blatantly false. Mr. Benson testified that Osmond 
used their recording facilities to make a master tape of certain 
recordings. Osmond then took the master tape elsewhere for 
duplication and sale. There is no evidence that Broadcast provided 
a blank tape to Osmond. Particularly, there is no evidence of any 
"subsequent sale of a master tape to Osmond" as stated by the Tax 
Commission in its decision. The testimony is to the opposite. The 
claimed transaction is a complete fabrication on the part of the 
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auditors and sustained by the Tax Commission. Clearly, this is an 
erroneous finding and must be reversed. 
F. ISSUE 6. 
THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO HONOR 
ITS LONG-STANDING EXEMPTION FROM SALES TAXES 
FOR SALE OF "CUSTOM'1 AS DISTINGUISHED FROM 
"CANNED" SOFTWARE. 
Initially the Auditing Division viewed the "Osmond" issue 
as whether Broadcast's sale to Osmond was of "custom" or "canned" 
software, the former being subject to sales tax and the latter 
not. Ms. Andersen justified the assessment against Broadcast of 
its alleged sales to Osmond under Rule R865-19-92S, which defines 
"custom" and "canned" software and describes the cases in which tax 
is imposed on "canned" software. Deposition of Anna K. Anderson 
at 29. 
Assuming that Broadcast's sale to Osmond was for "soft-
ware," there was no statute, no rule and thus no justifiable basis 
upon which to impose such a tax without promulgating a rule. This 
is especially true given the Auditing Division's policy at the time 
of exempting software sales from taxation. See Exhibit 4 of Anna 
Andersen Deposition. See also Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986) . Ms. Andersen claimed her 
letter to IBM dated January 13, 1989 only applied to "custom" 
software, but the letter (Exhibit 4) does not say that. Neither 
does it imply the distinction she now claims for it since IBM was 
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selling "licensed programs" (presumably "canned software") tax free 
per Anna Andersen's directive of January 13, 1989. Rule R865-19-
92S was not adopted until 1991. 
If it is assumed the Auditing Division can impose a tax 
without statutory authority or by retroactive application of 
Rule R865-19-92S, Broadcast's sale is still not taxable (as 
distinguished from an exemption from taxation). First, Broadcast's 
total involvement was allowing Osmond to use its studio. See 
discussion under Issue 5. Second, under Rule R865-19-92S, the 
"master tape" Broadcast sold to Osmond was "custom software" in 
that it was a "program or set of programs designed and written for 
a particular user." The tape was unique to and for Merrill Osmond. 
The tape did not therefore constitute the sale of tangible personal 
property and was not taxable. 
Even assuming that the tape was "canned software," 
however, it was a "sale for resale" and not taxable. The Auditing 
Division's Answer, which presumes the sale was for tangible 
personal property, states that such sales are "subject to taxation 
unless Petitioner can produce a valid exemption certificate issued 
to it by the purchaser which identifies these items as being 
purchased for resale." Answer to Amended Petition at 5. At the 
formal hearing an exemption certificate (Petitioner's Exhibit P-26) 
given by Osmond to Broadcast and signed by Merrill Osmond was 
entered into evidence. (Hearing Transcript at 221.) The Auditing 
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Division objects to this Exemption Certificate because "We can't 
just accept a certificate signed by anyone without a resale 
number." (Hearing Transcript at 333.) This excuse for not hon-
oring the exemption certificate appears mean spirited and 
contravenes Rule R865-19-23S, which expressly includes "other 
similar acceptable evidence to support the vendor's claim that a 
sale is for resale or otherwise exempt." In other words, the Sales 
and Use Tax Act and Rule R86S-19-23S were intended to except from 
taxation those sales in which the vendor can produce bona fide 
evidence that the sale was for resale. Dishonoring an exemption 
certificate because it does not have a "resale number" ignores the 
statute and the rule. The Auditing Division's justification for 
refusing to exempt the Broadcast-Osmond transaction from taxation, 
even though it knows Broadcast's sale to Osmond was for resale, is 
frivolous. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the Tax Commission stated in its decision, the issue 
is whether Broadcast purchased satellite receiving equipment from 
Utah vendors and "sold" that equipment to its subscribers. If so, 
the initial purchase was a nontaxable "sale for resale." Under the 
Sales and Use Tax Act, "sale" is defined broadly to include many 
arrangements or transactions which are not sales under common and 
commercial definitions of that term. Specifically, the definition 
of the word "sale" for purposes of the Sales and Use Tax Act, 
includes the grant of "possession, use or operation" of tangible 
personal property which "would be taxable if an outright sale were 
made." The uncontroverted evidence was that through the service 
agreements and the course of conduct between the parties, Broadcast 
granted possession of its equipment to its subscribers by 
installing the equipment at its subscribers' places of business and 
leaving the equipment under the subscribers' custody and control. 
After installation, the subscribers operated the equipment by 
selecting the type of music to receive, making arrangements for its 
in-store advertising with their product suppliers, sending and 
receiving electronic mail and video conferencing, and utilizing 
debit or credit transactions and payments. The subscribers 
operated and used the equipment through turning the equipment on 
and off, controlling the volume, providing simple maintenance, 
loading the printers with paper, checking the status of the 
equipment through the manipulation of buttons and other similar 
activities. The rights, actions and activities of the subscribers 
clearly include the possession, operation or use of the equipment 
under any normally accepted definitions of those terms, including 
the statutory definitions provided in the Sales and Use Tax Act. 
The Tax Commission's contrary decision is manifestly unfair, 
illogical, unlawful, and erroneous and must be reversed. 
If notwithstanding Broadcast's arguments under Issue 1, 
the Court upholds the ruling that Broadcast's initial purchases 
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not "for resale" then Broadcast is entitled under two independent 
statutory provisions -- Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-801 and 59-12-
104(28) --to receive a credit for the sales or use taxes it has 
paid to another state or jurisdiction on the same property. The 
explicit statutory language unambiguously provides for the credit. 
Any other interpretation of the statute requires reading conditions 
and qualifications into the statutory language which the 
legislature did not enact. In addition, failure to grant the 
credit relief subjects Broadcast to double taxation in violation of 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Tax 
Commission's decision to the contrary is unlawful and erroneous and 
must be reversed. 
As to upholding the imposition of the penalty, the Tax 
Commission's articulated reasons do not square with the evidence 
presented. Further, the taxpayer's theory of the case is based on 
a literal reading of the definition of the word "sale" in the Sales 
and Use Tax Act and as previously interpreted in the Young Electric 
Sign Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra. Broadcast's 
position is asserted in "good faith" as previously defined by the 
courts. The Tax Commission's decision upholding the penalty must 
be reversed. 
The imposition of tax on the "Osmond" transaction is 
directly contrary to the specific testimony presented. It relies 
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solely on the statutory notice prepared by the auditors without any 
basis. The finding must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tffL day of October, 1993. 
'iU.M/jv^i 
RANDY M. GRJTMSHAW 
MAXWELL A.///MILLER 
of and for ' 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Appendix A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
BROADCAST INTERNATIONAL, INC., ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
V. > AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 91-1402 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
) Account No. D52955 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on September 9 and 10, 1992. 
Commissioners Joe Pacheco and S. Blaine Willes of the 
Commission and Alan Hennebold, Administrative Law Judge, heard 
the matter on behalf of the Commission. Maxwell A. Miller and 
Randy M. Grimshaw, of Parsons Behle & Latimer, represented 
Petitioner. Clark L. Snelson, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 
represented Respondent. 
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1987 through 
September 1990. 
3. On August 1, 1991, the Audit Division assessed 
Broadcast with additional sales and use tax in the amount of 
$241,809.04/ a 10% negligence penalty in the amount of 
$24,180.92 and interest accrued at the statutory rate through 
August 31, 1991 in the amount of $47,456.09. Broadcast filed a 
timely appeal of the foregoing assessment with the Commission. 
4. Broadcast is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Midvale, Utah. It began doing 
business in 1985. 
5. Broadcast provides the services of a private 
satellite network to large retail businesses ("subscribers" 
hereafter) such as American Stores, Fleming Foods and Safeway. 
Broadcast's services can include background music, in-store 
advertising, electronic mail, video conferencing, stock and 
commodity quotes, check verification, and credit card services. 
6. Each subscriber determines the services it will 
receive from Broadcast. It also determines the contents of 
such services. For example, each subscriber selects the type 
of background music*.it will receive, makes arrangements for* its 
own in-store advertising directly with advertisers, and 
establishes the time and content of video conferences. The 
services selected by subscribers are delivered over Broadcast's 
satellite network, according to the subscriber's instructions. 
7. Broadcast's services are provided pursuant to 
"service agreements" negotiated between Broadcast and each 
subscriber. These contracts specify the types of service each 
subscriber will buy from Broadcast and the price of such 
services. Each contract requires Broadcast to supply all the 
equipment necessary to provide the agreed-upon services. 
8. Broadcast has over 4,000 installations at 
subscriber locations throughout the United States. 
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9. Broadcast provides its services to subscribers by 
means of a satellite dish and mount, low noise amplifier, 
connecting cable, printer and receiver at each location. 
Demodulators and "uplink" equipment are also sometimes used. 
Uplink equipment allows the subscriber to send, as well as 
receive, information over Broadcast's satellite network. If a 
particular subscriber already has some of the equipment 
necessary to receive Petitioner's services, such equipment is 
incorporated into Broadcast's system. 
10. Broadcast is bound by its service agreements to 
provide its services throughout the subscriber's hours of 
operation. Broadcast is also bound to furnish, install and 
maintain all equipment necessary for delivery of its services. 
Subscribers are contractually prohibited from moving the 
equipment, adding equipment, or altering the equipment. The 
service agreements specifically provide. . that. equipment 
furnished by Broadcast remains Broadcast's property. Such 
equipment is labeled as Broadcast's property and also marked 
with Broadcast's inventory number. 
11. Broadcast's employees or contractors install the 
necessary equipment at each subscriber's location. The 
satellite dish is typically mounted on the building's roof and 
attached to the building's framework. Cables connect the 
external equipment to the other components, which are usually 
located in a secure office. 
12. Broadcast usually obtains any permits necessary 
for the installation of its equipment at the subscriber's 
location. 
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13. After Broadcast has installed its equipment/ the 
subscriber determines how the system's volume should be set. 
Broadcast's employees make any necessary final adjustments to 
the equipment. 
14. Satellite dishes are passive devices. Once aimed, 
they do not require further operation. Printers and receivers 
must be plugged in and turned on and printers must be loaded 
with paper. Receivers have volume controls and "status" 
buttons which can generate print-outs for trouble-shooting 
purposes. 
15. Once Broadcast has installed the equipment, the 
subscriber communicates any desired changes in services to 
Broadcast, which then implements those changes from its 
location in Midvale. The subscribers cannot implement such 
changes in service themselves. 
16. After installation is complete, Broadcast's 
service staff visits each installation as required to maintain 
the system in good working order, averaging 1.1 visits per year 
to each site. 
17. Broadcast maintains a telephone based 
"trouble-shooting" unit to deal with system malfunctions. 
However, some subscribers instruct their employees to first 
contact the subscriber's own in-house "help desk" when problems 
arise. If the subscriber's help desk cannot resolve a problem 
through simple procedures, the subscriber calls Broadcast to 
correct the problem. 
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18. Subscribers are contractually bound to indemnify 
Broadcast for damage, destruction or loss to Broadcast's 
equipment while it is at the subscriber's location. 
19. It is possible for Broadcast to physically move 
its equipment from one location to another. Such relocation 
has rarely been necessary due to the fact that subscribers have 
usually renewed their contracts with Broadcast. 
20. Most of Broadcast's equipment was purchased from 
out of state vendors and shipped directly from the vendors to 
the installation site. In most cases, such sites were also out 
of state. Respondent has not assessed Utah sales or use tax on 
these out of state transactions. 
21. Respondent has assessed sales and use tax on 
Broadcast's purchases of equipment from Utah vendors, primarily 
"Digistar" receivers purchased from CDI in Orem, Utah. CDI 
delivered the receivers to Broadcast's Midvale office. They 
were stored in Utah, then shipped to installation sites usually 
outside Utah. 
22. At first, CDI charged sales tax on sales of 
receivers to Broadcast. Later, after Broadcast provided an 
exemption certificate stating that the receivers were being 
purchased for resale, CDI stopped charging sales tax. 
23. From the time it began doing business in 1985 
until 1988, Broadcast had no system for reporting and paying 
sales or use tax on acquisitions of equipment. Broadcast 
developed its system during 1988 and attempted to apply it 
retroactively to all prior equipment purchases. Under its 
system, Broadcast treats sales/use tax as due to the 
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jurisdiction in which the equipment is installed. Tax is 
calculated on the amount paid by Broadcast for the equipment. 
24. The equipment in question is carried as an asset 
on Broadcast's financial records. 
25. With respect to equipment used in Utah 
installations, Broadcast accrues use tax on such equipment as 
though it is the consumer. In other words, Broadcast pays tax 
to Utah based on its purchase price for the equipment, rather 
than on the payments it receives from subscribers. 
26. In a transaction unrelated to Broadcast's 
purchase of equipment, Broadcast provided a blank master tape 
to Merrill Osmond Enterprises ("Osmond" hereafter) and allowed 
Osmond to use Broadcast's facilities to record the master 
tape. Osmond then duplicated the master tape at another 
location, producing tapes for retail distribution. Broadcast 
did not charge sales tax on the transaction, nor did ,it request 
an exemption certificate from Osmond. 
27. After the Audit Division began its investigation 
of Broadcast's sales and use tax liability, Broadcast requested 
and obtained an exemption certificate from Osmond. However, 
the exemption certificate was not completed with an exemption 
number or a sales tax license number. 
28. The Audit Division imposed a 10% negligence 
penalty in this matter on the grounds that Broadcast failed to 
organize and conduct its business with reasonable prudence so 
as to provide for proper payment of taxes and had improperly 
issuing a resale exemption certificate to CDI. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1) levies a tax on the 
purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal 
property made within the state; and 
* • • 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, 
or consumed in this state. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104 exempts the following sales 
and uses from sales and use taxes: 
. . . 
(12) sales or use of property which the 
state is prohibited from taxing under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or 
under the laws of this state; 
. . . 
(25) property stored in the state for resale; 
. . . 
(27) property purchased for resale in this 
state, in the regular course of business, 
either in its original form or as an 
ingredient or component part of a 
manufactured or compounded product; and 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax 
was paid to some other state,, or one of. its 
subdivisions, except that the state shall be 
paid any difference between the tax paid and 
the tax imposed by this part. 
"Retail sale" is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
S59-12-102(8)(a) as: 
. . . any sale within the state of tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item 
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), 
other than resale of such property, item, or 
service by a retailer or wholesaler to a 
user or consumer. 
"Storage" is defined by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102(12) 
any keeping or retention of tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item 
or service . . . in this state for any 
purpose except sale in the regular course of 
business. 
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"Sale"/ as material to this appeal/ is defined by Utah 
Code Ann. 559-12-102(10)(e) as: 
any t ransac t ion under which r ight t o 
possess ion/ opera t ion / or use of any a r t i c l e 
of tang ib le personal property i s granted 
under a l e a s e or contract and the t rans fer 
of posses s ion would be taxable i f an 
outright s a l e were made, 
"Possession" i s def ined by Blacks Law 
Dictionary/ Revised Fourth E d i t i o n / as : 
The detent ion and c o n t r o l / or the manual or 
ideal custody/ of anything which may be the 
subject of property , for one's use and 
enjoyment/ e i t h e r as owner or as the 
proprietor of a q u a l i f i e d right in i t / and 
either he ld p e r s o n a l l y or by another who 
exercises i t in o n e ' s p lace and name. Act 
or s t a t e of p o s s e s s i n g . That condit ion of 
facts under which one can exerc i se h i s power 
over a corporeal t h i n g at h i s pleasure t o 
the exc lus ion of a l l o thers . 
"Use" i s def ined by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102(14) as: 
(a) the e x e r c i s e of any r ight or power over 
tangible personal property . . . incident t o 
the ownership or the leas ing of t h a t 
property/ item, or s e r v i c e . 
(b) Use does not inc lude the s a l e , d i s p l a y / 
demonstration, or t r i a l of that property in 
the regular course of business and held for 
resale . 
"Operate" i s de f ined by Webster's New C o l l e g i a t e 
Dictionary as "to perform a funct ion". 
Part V of the M u l t i s t a t e Tax Compact, as adopted by 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-801 , provides as fol lows: 
Each purchaser l i a b l e for a use tax on 
tangible personal property shal l be e n t i t l e d 
to f u l l c r e d i t for the combined amount or 
amounts of l e g a l l y imposed sa les or use t a x 
paid by him wi th respect to the same 
property to another s t a t e and any 
subdivision t h e r e o f . . . . 
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The State of Utah has entered into similar reciprocal 
agreements with other jurisdictions not parties to the 
Multistate Compact• 
Utah Administrative Rule R865-19-235(E) provides as 
follows: 
The burden of proving that a sale is for 
resale or otherwise exempt is upon the 
person who makes the sale. If any agent of 
the Tax Commission requests the vendor to 
produce a valid exemption certificate or 
other similar acceptable evidence to support 
the vendor's claim that a sale is for resale 
or otherwise exempt/ and the vendor is 
unable to comply, the sale will be 
considered taxable and the tax shall be 
payable by the vendor. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-110(5) provides as 
follows: 
If any part of the (sales tax) deficiency is 
due to negligence . . . there shall be added 
a penalty as provided in section 59-1-401 . 
. . to the amount of the deficiency . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401(3) provides in material part: 
The penalty for underpayment of tax is as 
follows: 
(a) If the underpayment of tax is due to 
negligence, the penalty is 10% of the 
underpayment. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Two separate fact situations underlie the assessment 
of sales and use tax in this matter. The first is Broadcast's 
purchase of equipment, primarily receivers, from Utah vendors. 
The second is Broadcast's sale of a "master recording tape" to 
Osmond. Broadcast's sales and use tax liability will be 
considered with respect to each of the foregoing fact 
situations. Thereafter, the Commission will consider the issue 
of penalties. 
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I. Equipment Purchased and Stored in Utah. 
As noted in the preceeding findings of fact/ Broadcast 
purchased some of its equipment from Utah vendors, primarily 
Digistar receivers from CDI in Orem. The equipment was then 
stored in Utah for a short time until it was transferred to out 
of state installation sites and connected to other equipment. 
The completed system enabled subscribers to receive Broadcast's 
services. 
Any inquiry regarding assessment of sales and use tax 
begins with the question of whether the tax-imposing sections 
of Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-101 et 
seq., "the Act" hereafter) reach the transactions at issue. 
The tax-imposing provisions of the Act must be liberally 
construed in favor of the taxpayer. Parsons Asphalt Products 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). 
Respondent raises S59-12-103.(l)(a)_ of the Act as a 
basis for imposing sales and use tax on Broadcast's purchases 
of equipment from Utah vendors. Section 59-12-103(1)(a) 
provides as follows: 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for 
the amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal 
property made within the state. 
Broadcast concedes it purchased the equipment in 
question from Utah vendors, but argues such purchases were not 
"retail sales" and therefore not subject to tax under 
§59-12-103(l)(a). 
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Section 59-12-102(8)(a) of the Act defines "retail 
sale" as follows: 
"Retail sale" means any sale within the 
state of tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), other than resale 
of such property, item, or service by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or 
consumer. (Emphasis added.) 
Under the foregoing definition of "retail sale"/ 
Broadcast's purchases of equipment from Utah vendors are retail 
sales, and therefore subject to tax, unless the equipment was 
purchased for resale. 
"Resale" is not defined by the Act. However, 
§59-12-102(10) defines "sale" as follows: 
"Sale" . . . includes: 
. . . 
(e) any transaction under which right to 
possession, operation, or use of any article 
of tangible personal property is granted 
under a lease or contract and such transfer 
of possession — would be taxable- if-' an1 
outright sale were made. 
Given the foregoing chain of statutory definitions, 
Broadcast's purchase of equipment from Utah vendors is not 
subject to sales and use tax under §59-12-103(l)(a) if 
purchased for resale. In the context of this case, Broadcast 
can only establish such a resale by showing that it granted its 
subscribers the right to possession, the right to operate, or 
the right to use such equipment. 
With respect to the right of possession, Broadcast 
grants no such right to its subscribers. To the contrary, 
Broadcast grants only the right to receive various services. 
Equipment is installed by Broadcast only to allow receipt of 
Broadcast's service. The equipment remains completely under 
-11-
Broadcast's authority. Broadcast can move, remove, or 
substitute equipment so long as the subscriber receives its 
services. 
As to "right to operate", the terra "operate" is not 
defined by the Act, and must therefore be applied according to 
its common meaning. "Operate" is defined by Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary as: "to perform a function". In the 
context of the contractual relationship between Broadcast and 
its subscribers, the subscribers are prohibited from tuning the 
receivers. They are also prohibited from connecting the 
equipment to any other equipment other than as installed by 
Broadcast. The equipment is completely dedicated to 
functioning as Broadcast's service delivery system. Under such 
circumstances, the subscriber's ability to turn the receiver on 
or off, push a button to obtain a status report, or increase 
the volume does, not constitute . the. "right to operate" the 
equipment. 
Finally, with respect to the subscriber's "right to 
use" the equipment, the Act defines "use" as the exercise of 
any right or power over tangible personal property. Once 
again, based upon Broadcast's service agreements with its 
subscribers as well as Broadcast's actual practice, the 
subscriber only has the "right" to receive services from 
Broadcast, but no right or power over the tangible property 
which delivers the services. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that 
Broadcast does not convey to its subscribers the right to 
possess, operate or use the equipment in question. The 
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Commission therefore holds that Broadcast does not resell such 
equipment. Consequently, Broadcast's purchase of the equipment 
was not for "resale" so as to escape imposition of sales and 
use tax under 559-12-103(1)(a). 
A second and independent basis for taxation with 
respect to the equipment is §59-12-103(1)(1), which imposes tax 
on the purchaser for the amount paid for tangible personal 
property "stored, used or consumed" in Utah. Clearly, 
Broadcast did not "use" or "consume" the equipment within this 
state and is subject to tax under §59-12-103(1)0) only if it 
"stored" the equipment here. 
The Act defines "storage" as "any keeping or retention 
of tangible personal property . . . in this state for any 
purpose except sale in the regular course of business." Under 
the undisputed facts of this case, Broadcast kept and retained 
the equipment in Utah, albeit a short period of. time. 
Broadcast is therefore subject to tax under §59-12-103(1)(1) 
unless it falls within the exclusion contained therein for 
property stored in Utah for "sale in the regular course of 
business." 
The application of the "resale" limitation has 
previously been discussed with respect to §59-12-103(1)(a). 
That discussion applies equally here. The Commission therefore 
concludes that Broadcast did not store the equipment in Utah 
for resale and that such equipment is subject to tax under 
§59-12-103(1)0). 
The Commission has concluded that Broadcast's 
equipment purchases in Utah are subject to tax under 
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S59-12-103(l)(a) and, alternatively, that the storage of such 
equipment in Utah is subject to tax under §59-12-103(l)(l). 
The Commission will next consider whether any of the Act's 
exemption provisions relieve Broadcast of such tax liability. 
Such exemption provisions are strictly construed against 
Broadcast. (Parsons Asphalt Products v. State Tax Commission, 
supra; Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 187 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
17 (Utah 1992).) 
Broadcast argues it is exempt from taxation under 
§59-12-104(12) because the transactions in question are in 
interstate commerce. However, Broadcast is a Utah corporation 
that purchased the equipment in Utah, took delivery in Utah, 
then stored the equipment in Utah. Such intrastate 
transactions are not within the exemption provided by 
§59-12-104(12). 
Broadcast also argues* it is exempt from taxation under 
§59-12-104(25), pertaining to property purchased in Utah for 
resale, or §59-12-104(27), pertaining to property stored in 
Utah for resale. The Commission has already dealt with the 
"resale" issue, concluding that the equipment in question was 
not purchased or stored in Utah for resale. For that reason, 
Broadcast's purchase and storage of the equipment does not 
qualify for exemption from sales and use tax under either 
§59-12-104(25) or §59-12-104(27). 
Finally, Broadcast argues that under §59-12-104(28) of 
the Act, it is entitled to a credit for sales and use tax paid 
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on the equipment to other jurisdictions. Section 59-12-104(28) 
provides: 
The following sales and uses are exempt from 
the tax imposed by this chapter: 
• • • 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax 
was paid to some other state, or one of its 
subdivisions, except that the state shall be 
paid any difference between the tax paid and 
the tax imposed by this# part and Part 2, and 
adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was 
greater than the tax imposed by this part 
and Part 2; 
Similarly, the Multistate Tax Compact, Article V, found in Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-801 et seq, provides: 
Each purchaser liable for a use tax on 
tangible personal property shall be entitled 
to full credit for the combined amount or 
amounts of legally imposed sales or use 
taxes paid by him with respect to the same 
property to another state and any 
subdivision thereof. . . . 
Broadcast contends that the foregoing statutes grant a 
credit to Broadcast, to be applied against its. Utah sales and 
use tax liability, for sales and use taxes which were later 
paid to other jurisdictions. Broadcast also argues that 
failure to allow such credit would violate the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
The Commission has previously concluded that 
Broadcast's purchases of CDI receivers from a Utah vendor were 
intrastate transactions. Therefore, Broadcast's Commerce 
Clause arguments are not well founded. 
As to Broadcast's claim for credit for taxes paid to 
other jurisdictions, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed at 
least a portion of that issue in Chicago Bridge & Iron, 196 
Utah Advance Reporter 18 (1992), holding that because the first 
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taxable event occurred in Utah, sales and use tax was payable 
to Utah. Chicago Bridge & Iron was decided by reference to the 
Multistate Compact. That logic is equally applicable with 
respect to other jurisdictions which are not members of the 
multistate compact, but which have entered into reciprocal 
agreements of the same nature with the State of Utah. The same 
result is also reached under §59-12-104(28) itself. Section 
59-12-104(28) pertains only to sales or uses in Utah which 
involve property already taxed in other jurisdictions. If the 
the tax is first due in Utah, §59-12-104(28) does not apply. 
Otherwise, Utah's ability to collect sales and use tax would be 
subject to a taxpayer's decision to first pay tax elsewhere. 
In the case now before the Commission, Broadcast 
purchased the equipment in Utah before shipping the equipment 
to other jurisdictions. The first taxable event therefore 
occurred in Utah "and the tax on the transaction" is payable to 
Utah. The Commission concludes that Broadcast may not claim a 
credit against its Utah tax liability for taxes paid to other 
jurisdictions. 
In summary, then, the Commission concludes that 
Broadcast is liable under Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act for tax 
upon the amount paid by it for equipment either purchased from 
Utah vendors or stored in Utah. Broadcast is not entitled to 
credit against its Utah tax liability for sales or use taxes 
paid to other jurisdictions. 
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II. The Osmond Transaction 
The second issue before the Commission relates to the 
imposition of tax on Broadcast's sale to Osmond of a master 
recording tape. 
The Audit Division bases its assessment of tax on its 
conclusion that Broadcast produced and sold a master recording 
tape to Osmond, and that such a sale constitutes a retail sale 
of tangible personal property. For its part, Broadcast 
maintains that it merely leased its facilities to Osmond, and 
that Osmond then both produced the recording and provided the 
blank master tape itself. According to Broadcast, such a fact 
situation does not give rise to a sales or use tax. 
The Commission has reviewed the record in this 
matter. Although the testimony at the hearing is inconclusive 
on the question of whether Broadcast provided the blank master 
tape, the pleadings serve to clarify such testimony. Based 
upon the entire record, the Commission has determined that 
Broadcast provided the blank tape and recording facilities from 
which the master tape was produced. The subsequent sale of the 
master tape to Osmond was, therefore, a sale of tangible 
personal property subject to sales and use tax under Utah Code 
Ann- §59-12-103(1). 
Broadcast argues that it has obtained an exemption 
certificate from Osmond indicating that the master tape was 
purchased for resale, and that by virtue of the exemption 
certificate Broadcast had no obligation to collect the tax from 
Osmond. It is clear from the record that the exemption 
certificate's statement that the master tape was purchased for 
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resale is incorrect. The master tape was in fact consumed by 
Osmond, and not acquired for resale. Furthermore, Broadcast 
acknowledges that it did not obtain the exemption certificate 
at the time of transaction, but only after the Audit Division 
had commenced its audit. Furthermore, when the exemption 
certificate was finally received, it was improperly completed. 
Under such circumstances, Broadcast cannot claim to have relied 
on the exemption certificate. The Commission therefore 
concludes that Broadcast cannot rely upon an inaccurate, 
incomplete, after-the-fact exemption certificate to escape tax 
liability on the Osmond transaction. 
III. PENALTY 
The final issue is whether a negligence penalty is 
appropriate with respect to Broadcast's tax liability. 
When Broadcast began doing business, it admittedly did 
so without any attention to Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act. 
Broadcast's inattention continued well into the audit period. 
Furthermore, Broadcast has taken inconsistent positions with 
respect to its in-state and out-of-state tax liabilities. In 
Utah, Broadcast has considered itself to be the consumer of the 
equipment in question, and has therefore paid sales tax on the 
purchase price of the equipment. If Broadcast had considered 
itself to be the seller of the Utah equipment, as it claims to 
be in other states, it would have been obligated to pay sales 
and use tax on the entire amount of its service fees received 
from Utah customers. 
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With respect to the Osmond transaction, Broadcast's 
sale of a master recording tape was clearly a sale of tangible 
personal property, subject to sales and use tax. 
In view of Broadcast's inattention to its sales and 
use tax liability during the initial portion of the audit 
period, its adoption of inconsistent positions with respect to 
its Utah and out-of-state installations, and its neglect of 
sales and use liability on the Osmond transaction, the 
Commission concludes that the 10% negligence penalty imposed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§59-12-110(5) and 59-1-401 is 
appropriate. 
IV. ORDER 
In summary, the Commission concludes that Broadcast is 
liable for sales and use tax with respect to the amount paid by 
it for equipment purchased from Utah vendors or stored in 
Utah. Broadcast is not entitled to credit against its Utah 
sales and use tax liability for sales and use taxes paid to 
other jurisdictions. Broadcast is also liable for sales and 
use tax with respect to the Osmond transaction. Finally, the 
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10% negligence penalty imposed by the Audit Division is 
affirmed. It is so ordered. 
it 4-DATED this l(y day of ty/^ 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
1993. 
R.H. Hansen 
Chairman 
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fht^mllMk 
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order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
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Appendix B 
APPENDIX B 
SELECTED EXCERPTS OF THE HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Section 1. Possession of Equipment 
Hearing Transcript p. 41, line 16 through p. 43, line 20. 
(Testimony of Dwight Egan, President of Broadcast) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw] . Thank you. This is a paragraph that 
seems to have created some particular misunderstandings 
between the Auditing Division and Broadcast. It seems to 
say that in order to receive the services that Broadcast 
provides you will furnish, and I believe the operative 
verbs are "furnish, install and keep in good operating 
condition" all equipment necessary for the subscriber to 
receive the satellite transmissions. Is that a fair 
reading of what that says? 
A. [By Mr. Egan] . Yes. The company provides that equipment 
so that they can receive those services. 
Q. The company shall furnish, install and keep. Did you 
intend, Mr. Egan, to transfers possession of this 
equipment to the subscriber by the use of those operative 
verbs? 
A. Inasmuch as the subscriber could not receive any of our 
services without having possession of equipment, having 
it installed on their roof, yes, we intended to transfer 
possession to the subscriber. 
Q. What, Mr. Egan, would you define the word possession as 
you understand it? 
A. I understand possession to mean that in this case the 
subscriber would have the equipment on their premises. 
In this case, the equipment is mounted permanently onto 
their roof. It involves drilling a hole into their roof, 
attaching it to the membranes of the building. It 
includes often times welding, reflashing the roof to 
maintain the roof warranty, cabling from that point down 
to the manager's office where another fixture is attached 
to the wall to house the receiver, and attendant other 
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equipment which may include a video recorder or a 
television set. 
By possession I mean that they have it there on their 
premises within their control throughout the term of the 
contract. In fact, if we were to take the equipment out 
we would be in breach of contract, any they could not 
receive the services. They have to have the equipment to 
receive the services. We have to provide the equipment, 
furnish it, install it, keep it in good operating 
condition in order to comply with our contractual terms. 
Q. So in your opinion then using that, I think, general 
definition of the word possession the you just provided, 
in your opinion the subscribers have possession of this 
equipment? 
A. They have possession of our equipment in every sense that 
I know of what possession would mean. They certainly 
have possession of our equipment in the same way that a 
cable subscriber has possession of a Showtime box or a 
Digital Music Express box in their home. They have it. 
They may connect it to other peripheral pieces of 
equipment, but they have it there in their home. They 
have it there in their store. We may never see it again. 
We hope to never see it again because we want them to 
continue to have a contractual relationship with us. 
Hearing Transcript p. 81 line 25 through p. 82 line 23 (Testimony 
of Dwight Egan, President of Broadcast) 
Q: [By Mr. Grimshaw] Let's follow Mr. Snelson's line of 
questioning a little bit. If possession is not granted 
by the contract, as he would have us believe, to the 
subscribers, how would you suggest the subscribers 
receive the equipment? 
A: [By Mr. Egan] They would have no way -- receive the 
services, you mean? 
Q: No. Receive the equipment. I'm talking about the 
equipment. There are several ways, I guess, to have 
possession of equipment. One would be you grant them 
rights to have possession. Another way they steal the 
equipment. They take it by extortion. They get it by 
conversion. Are you in any way suggesting that the 
subscribers have rights and have possession of this 
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equipment in any way other than through your grant of 
rights? 
A: No. They have a grant of right through this contract. 
They sign a contract that enables me to go to the bank to 
get money to buy dishes to put on their roofs, and that 
is the context in which they have possession. 
If our contract said we are going to grant you 
possession, operation and use, I don't know that that 
would change things here. The characterization of what 
we have done is very simple. We provide services and it 
requires satellite receiving equipment to receive the 
services period. They cannot get them any other way from 
our company. 
Hearing Transcript p. 226 line 4 through line 23 (Testimony of Reed 
L. Benson, General Counsel of Broadcast) 
Q: [By Mr. Miller] Did these license agreements have a 
provision by which the subscriber or by which Broadcast 
International was to furnish and install equipment at the 
subscriber's location? 
A: [By Mr. Benson] Yes. 
Q: Do all the agreements have such a provision? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was your intent in drafting that provision? 
A: The intent was to fulfill the intent of the parties. 
That is, that we would deliver a service to them via 
satellite, and the only way we could do that was to 
install our satellite receiving equipment at each of the 
locations that were to receive it. 
Q: Are you familiar with the course of conduct of the 
parties after these agreements have been signed? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Pursuant to the course of conduct after the agreements 
have been signed, have the subscribers obtained 
possession of the equipment? 
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A: Yes. 
Hearing Transcript p. 91, line 25 through p. 94, line 17. 
(Testimony of John Lasater, Manager of Store Systems for SaveMart 
Supermarkets) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw]. I'd like to focus on the particular 
equipment just for a minute before we get into detail as 
to what those services are and how they are performed. 
What equipment is installed in each of your stages? And 
by equipment I'm talking about the satellite equipment 
that we have been talking about here today. 
A. [By Mr. Lasater] . Each store has a dish on the roof. 
Each store has a Personal Earth Station. It has a 
receiver, and it also has the Okidata printer. It's the 
one that is used for the E mail. 
Q. Does Broadcast or Broadcast personnel have access to the 
equipment that's installed in your stores? 
A. The only time they have access to the equipment is when 
they are called by our help desk when it would be an 
equipment failure. Our help desk is the first line of 
communication. None of the stores are allowed to call 
Broadcast by themselves. They route the call through our 
help desk. We do first line of support to try to solve 
the problem. If we feel that it is an equipment failure, 
then we call Broadcast International and they dispatch. 
Q. When you say you call help desk, help me understand. 
Suppose the music stops playing, what would happen? 
A. The music stops playing, they call our help desk, and the 
first thing we ask them, we ask them what is on the 
receiver, do they have a red signal light on, which means 
that the signal is weak or they're having a problem. We 
would probably have them reset, and we would also take a 
status report from them first and review that with them, 
have them reset the system. It comes back in about three 
to five minutes, and generally that solves the problem. 
If the problem is more extensive, then we would place the 
call. 
Q. So internally you try to find out what the particular 
problem is. Only if you're unsuccessful internally, 
would you then contact Broadcast; is that correct? 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. That raises a question I'd like to ask. Where, in 
general, I know that each store may be a little 
different, but where in general inside a store will this 
equipment be installed? 
A. Ninety-five percent of the stores it's installed in a 
secured manager's office. In fact, to my knowledge, all 
equipment is in a manger's office. Sometimes that also 
is a bookkeeper's office because the location and the 
size of the store is very small, but it's all in a 
secured part of the building. 
Q. Did you decide, is it the SaveMart decision to have it in 
a secured place in the manager's office? 
A. Yes. We designate where it will be placed. 
Q. Why do you want it in some kind of secure place? 
A. Because we have problems with employees, night crew 
people that want to play different types of music. They 
tend to interfere with the system, which would mean the 
next day, of course, we are going to have to do first 
line of support and maybe call out service for damages 
done. 
Hearing Transcript p. 105, line 18 through p. 106, line 8. 
(Testimony of John Lasater, Manager of Store Systems for SaveMart 
Supermarkets) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw] . You've been sitting here this 
morning, Mr. Lasater, and I think you probably, from the 
testimony that has been given, are generally aware that 
we are arguing about some fairly common terms, 
possession, use, and operation. Those are terms that are 
used in Utah statute. They may not have any relevance in 
California where you're from, but they are terms that 
have relevance in Utah statute. Could you give us, and 
I'm not asking for any kind of a lawyer definition, but 
could you just give us a general definition of the word 
possession, what you view the word possession to mean. 
A. [By Mr. Lasater] . SaveMart views the word possession as 
the fact that we have the equipment secured at our store 
locations. We physically have the equipment. 
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Q. And I take it it's your testimony that from SaveMart's 
perspective you have possession of this equipment? 
A. We have possession of all the equipment, yes. 
Section 2. Operation of Equipment 
Hearing Transcript p. 56, line 18 through p. 58, line 23. 
(Testimony of Dwight Egan, President of Broadcast) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw]. Let's focus on the word operate for 
a minute. Again, the Auditing Division has made certain 
claims that the subscribers do not operate this 
equipment. Would you describe from your point of view 
how the subscribers operate this equipment? 
A. [By Mr. Egan] . Well, there are various pieces of 
equipment at issue here. Certain pieces of equipment 
certainly have more hands on operation than others. A 
satellite receiver, of course, to some degree is a 
passive device which receives signals and passes them on. 
A computer printer that they receive electronic mail on 
is something that has to have paper loaded. We do not go 
out and put paper in somebody's printer. They have to 
load their own paper. They have to buy their own paper. 
They have to put it in. They have to push the button 
that says I want to set the top. They have to push the 
button that says they are ready to go, and they have to 
make sure that it's at all times connected from a cable 
standpoint. 
They certainly use a television set or VCR as they watch 
and participate in a video conference. We are not there 
to watch the video conference. They conduct this on 
their own. The only involvement that Broadcast 
International would have on that type of broadcast is to 
authorize receivers to receive it. Similar to again 
somebody like Showtime authorizing a box to receive their 
signal having been subscribed to by the end user. 
So they operate it in having to set paper, tear paper 
off, push a button to check status on the receiver, make 
sure it's plugged in, make sure it's connected properly 
to their other devices in the store that it may be 
connected to, other computer devices or amplifiers or 
other things that they may own. It varies from piece of 
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equipment to piece of equipment as to how much they 
actually manhandle it. But indeed in all cases they 
manhandle it to some degree. 
When a person calls our service center from 3,000 miles 
away, they have to stand there in front of that equipment 
and operate it, in order to tell us even what's wrong 
with it, in order for us to decide whether or not we are 
going to send a service repairman out at considerable 
cost to the company or whether we can have them fix it on 
the phone. We try to fix as many as possible on the 
phone by having them go through a series of diagnostic 
tests where they push a button to give us the status, 
tell us what the status is. We may send another group of 
codes to reprogram the E prompts and so on. But in every 
sense of the word, an employee of the store, generally 
its manager, is standing in front of it operating it, 
pushing buttons, making sure it's connected and so on. 
Q. Does Broadcast or Broadcast employees have access to this 
equipment once it's installed? 
A. Broadcast would only have access to the equipment to 
render maintenance on the equipment in the case where a 
store employee or manager, in most cases, is not able to 
satisfactorily get the equipment in working order. We 
indeed send out repairmen to repair a receiver, or in 
some cases, to send it back to be repaired to a warehouse 
and so on. But we try to do that as little as possible 
because that is a great expense to the company. 
Hearing Transcript p. 106, line 22 through p. 107, line 10. 
(Testimony of John Lasater, Manager of Store Systems for SaveMart 
Supermarkets) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw] . Likewise the word "operate, " could 
you give us a general definition of that term. 
A. [By Mr. Lasater] . I would give the definition that we 
operate the equipment in the manner in which it has been 
designed. We use the equipment. It operates for us. 
That's a little difficult for me. I mean there is really 
nothing to operating it. You know, once it's set up, it 
actually just takes care of itself. 
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Q. Except for the functions that we have described, like 
turning off and on the equipment, fixing the printer, 
making sure the right select modes are chosen. 
A. That's correct. In these cases, it would be, I guess, 
considered an operation, and we do operate. Or when we 
run the E mail, I would think of that as being an 
operation because we actually are sending data. 
Section 3. Use of Equipment 
Hearing Transcript p. 55, line 15 through p. 56, line 17. 
(Testimony of Dwight Egan, President of Broadcast) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw]. The Auditing Division, I think, has 
made some claims, Mr. Egan, that the subscribers do not 
possess the equipment that I think we have discussed that 
previously. They have also made some claims that the 
subscribers do not use the equipment. Would you tell us 
how the subscribers use the equipment, what the 
subscribers actually do with this equipment? 
A. [By Mr. Egan] . Well, I mean, this is basically like 
asking who uses the television set in a home. Does KSL 
television use it because they happen to broadcast 
signals to it, or does the individual participant in the 
home or the individual subscriber to Showtime or Digital 
Music Express. Who uses it, who has the benefits of it. 
Obviously Broadcast doesn't have the benefits of the 
background music. We are here in Utah, not in California 
or Washington D.C. 
So the customers and the employees of the store are 
listening to the background music and enjoying its 
benefits. They are selling the ads. They are airing the 
ads to influence customers' decisions at the point of 
sale. They are sending electronic mail, and they are 
certainly conducting and airing and watching their own 
video conferences. 
To me, I don't know how we would construe the broadcast 
as having -- using it in the beneficial sense of 
receiving the services that we are providing to those 
customers. It's clearly, in my view, the customers are 
using that equipment every bit as much as a customer of 
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TCI Cable is watching or listening to a programming 
delivered from a cable or from a local broadcast station. 
Hearing Transcript p. 106, line 7 through line 20. (Testimony of 
John Lasater.) 
Q. [By Mr. Grimshaw] . Would you give me a general 
definition of the word "use" in the context of equipment 
being used. 
A. [By Mr. Lasater]. Equipment is at the store locations 
for our use. It is to handle our daily needs, whether it 
be for payment, music, E mail or whatever. It is there 
for our specific needs, and we are the ones that use it 
at our discretion. 
Q. From SaveMart's perspective, I take it that you believe 
you use this equipment? 
A. Yes, we do use this equipment. 
Q. You use it daily? 
A. We use it daily. 
Q. Hourly? 
A. Yes. 
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Appendix C 
APPENDIX C 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
1. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 
[3.] To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1) (a) (1987) 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible 
personal property made within the 
state; 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1) (1) (1987) 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or 
consumed in this state. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8) (a) (1987) 
As used in this chapter: 
(8) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the 
state of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-
103(1), other than resale of such property, item, 
or service by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or 
consumer. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1987) 
As used in this chapter: 
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, 
or barter, conditional or otherwise in any manner, 
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of tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for 
a consideration. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a 
sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, 
services, or entertainment taxable under this 
chapter; 
(d) any transaction if the possession of 
property is transferred but the seller retains 
the title as security for the payment of the 
price; and 
(e) any transaction under which right to 
possession, operation, or use of any article 
of tangible personal property is granted under 
a lease or contract and the transfer of 
possession would be taxable if an outright 
sale were made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(12) (1987) 
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or 
retention of tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), in this state for any 
purpose except sale in the regular course of 
business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) (a) 
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any 
right or power over tangible personal property 
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the 
ownership or the leasing of that property, 
item, or service. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) (1987) 
The following sales and uses are exempt from 
the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
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(2 8) property upon which a sales or use tax 
was paid to some other state, or one of its 
subdivisions, except that the state shall be 
paid any difference between the tax paid and 
the tax imposed by this part and Part 2, and 
no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was 
greater than the tax imposed by this part and 
Part 2; 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987) 
ARTICLE V. ELEMENTS OF SALES AND USE TAX LAWS 
Tax Credit 
1. Each purchaser liable for a use tax on 
tangible personal property shall be entitled 
to full credit for the combined amount or 
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes 
paid by him with respect to the same property 
to another state and any subdivision thereof. 
The credit shall be applied first against the 
amount of any use tax due the state, and any 
unused portion of the credit shall then be 
applied against the amount of any use tax due 
a subdivision. Exemption Certificates, 
Vendors May Rely 
2. Whenever a vendor receives and accepts in 
good faith from a purchaser a resale or other 
exemption certificate or other written 
evidence of exemption authorized by the 
appropriate state or subdivision taxing 
authority, the vendor shall be relieved of 
liability for a sales or use tax with respect 
to the transaction. 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1) (b) (1993) 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative 
proceedings commenced before the commission, 
the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(b) grant the commission no deference 
concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, 
unless there is an explicit grant of 
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discretion contained in a statute at 
issue before the appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1987) 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court 
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1992) 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the 
Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction, except: . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Rule R865-19-23S 
A. Taxpayers selling tangible personal property or 
services to exempt customers are required to keep records 
verifying the nontaxable status of such sales. Records 
shall include: 
1. sales invoices showing the name and identity 
of the customer, and 
2. exemption certificates for exempt sales of 
tangible personal property or services if the 
exemption category is shown on the exemption 
certificate forms or if the sale is to a government 
agency, and the total sale is $100 or less. 
B. The Tax Commission will furnish samples of 
acceptable exemption certificate forms on request. Stock 
quantities are not furnished, but taxpayers may reproduce 
samples as needed in whole or in part. 
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C. Exemption certificates are not required for sales to 
qualified government agencies (federal, state, counties, 
and cities--including schools), but the vendor must keep 
a purchase order or other acceptable evidence of 
exemption, such as a copy of a check or voucher. 
D. If a purchaser is unable to segregate tangible 
personal property or services which he purchases for 
resale from tangible personal property or services which 
he purchases for his own consumption, everything should 
be purchased tax-free. He must then report and pay the 
tax on the cost of goods or services purchased tax-free 
for resale but which are used or consumed. 
E. The burden of proving that a sale is for resale or 
otherwise exempt is upon the person who makes the sale. 
If any agent of the Tax Commission requests the vendor to 
produce a valid exemption certificate or other similar 
acceptable evidence to support the vendor's claim that a 
sale is for resale or otherwise exempt, and the vendor is 
unable to comply, the sale will be considered taxable and 
the tax shall be payable by the vendor. 
Rule 865-19-92S 
A. Definitions: 
1. "Canned computer software" or "prewritten 
computer software" means a program or set of 
programs that can be purchased and used without 
modification and has not been prepared at the 
special request of the purchaser to meet their 
particular needs. 
2. "Custom computer software" means a program or 
set of programs designed and written specifically 
for a particular user. The program must be 
customer ordered and can incorporate preexisting 
routines utilities or similar program components. 
The addition of a customer name or account titles 
or codes will not constitute a customer program. 
3. "Computer-generated output" means the 
microfiche, microfilm, paper, discs, tapes, molds, 
or other tangible personal property generated by a 
computer. 
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4. "License agreement" means the same as a lease 
or rental of computer software. 
B. The sale, rental or lease of canned or prewritten 
computer software constitutes a sale of tangible personal 
property and is subject to the sales or use tax. 
Payments under a license agreement are taxable as a lease 
or rental of the software package. Charges for program 
maintenance, consultation in connection with a sale or 
lease, enhancements, or upgrading of canned or prewritten 
software are taxable. 
C. The sale, rental or lease of custom computer 
software is exempt from the sales or use tax, regardless 
of the form in which the program is transferred. Charges 
for services such as program maintenance, consultation in 
connection with a sale or lease, enhancements, or 
upgrading of custom software are not taxable. 
D. Charges for services to modify or adapt canned 
computer software or prewritten computer software to a 
purchaser's needs or equipment are not taxable if the 
charges are separately stated and identified. 
E. The sale of computer generated output is subject to 
the sales or use tax if the primary object of the sale is 
the output and not the services rendered in producing the 
output. 
F. This rule cites the most common types of 
transactions involving computer software and it should 
not be construed to be inclusive but merely illustrative 
in nature. 
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